William wanted a tightly-knit officer corps, which he considered to be the
best protection against the popular wish of his people for freedom and self-government.
William wanted to keep recruits for a period of three years, instead of
the normal two, in order to give him time to develop loyalty to the crown
among the soldiers. The opposition, on the other band, thought of the Landwehr
as an expression of a more popular and liberal regime.
The Army Bill, introduced in the Prussian Landtag (diet) on February 10,
1860, sought an increase of 39 infantry divisions and 10 cavalry regiments.
This, in fact, would have made military service compulsory. Parity between
the new recruits (the line) and the Landwehr was thus abandoned.
Latter the Landwehr would have come under the command of line officers.
The Landwehr would thus have been separated from the field army.
The military establishment did accept the increase in army size, but they
also retained the Landwehr as such and the traditional two-year service
period.
The government of Prussia then did something that could hardly have been
done anywhere else. It used the 9 million thaler grant to proceed on the
reform without having explicit authorization from the Landtag. This lead
to a deadlock between government and diet. A new diet in 1861 refused to
pass the reform bill or to increase the size of the general budget. The
so-called "new era" in Prussia then came to an end with the resignation
of the liberal Auerswald Ministry.
Another diet in 1862 was elected with an even greater block of representatives
from the Progressive Party, now powerful enough to attempt major constitutional
reform by using the Landwehr issue. The new Landtag wanted to reduce the
power of the upper house of the diet, since it was the lever of government
manipulation. An impasse had been reached and the king was desperate.
At this point Bismarck was brought into the picture. He was what the Germans
call a Herrennatur (dominant personality). As an old-fashioned landed aristocrat,
Bismarck had absolutely no sympathy for urban, bourgeois life. From the
start he believe that force against Austria was necessary to push her out
of the scene and then unify Germany without Austria. As a matter of tactic,
he believed that one had to bring any situation to such a point that improvement
became an absolute necessity. He also believed, and this is important, that
foreign policy always determined domestic policy. The Germans call this
das Primat der Aussenpolitik (the primacy of foreign policy).
On September 30, 1862 Bismarck made his famous iron and blood speech before
the budget commission, where the army bill was bottled up. He said, in effect,
that no amount of debating and negotiating is ever going to unify Germany;
if she is s going to be unified it will have to be done by military force.
He then practiced what he preached by withdrawing the budget proposal and
ordering the government bureaucracy to collect taxes without Diet authorization.
No minister before him had had the courage to do such a thing. To rationalize
his actions he developed the new "theory of the gap" (Lücke):
there was no provision in the constitution that tells us which of the three
institutions (upper house, lower house, crown) must yield when no agreement
exists among them. Since the state must continue to live, the government
simply has to collect taxes and spend them.
Simultaneously, Bismarck launched a loud campaign against the liberal opposition
in the Diet and the press. Public sentiment at this point was largely lined
up against the government. Even Crown Prince Frederick disassociated himself
pointedly from the repressive measures Bismarck pushed. It was Ferdinand
Lasalle, the father of German socialism, who showed how the Prussian situation
(unlike the English) made it possible for the people to continue paying
taxes without parliamentary authorization. Respect for monarchical authority
and a deeply ingrained sense of obedience to superiors did the trick for
Bismarck. He knew his fellow countrymen well. Then foreign wars and nationalist
issues interfered to overshadow the progress of German liberalism.
Bismarck had to fight three wars to unify Germany. The 1864 Danish War helped
Bismarck consolidate his internal position in Prussia. The War of 1866 ousted
Austria from leadership in Germany for good. The Franco-Prussian War of
1870-71 brought the South under the aegis of the Prussian eagle. That was
the unification process in a nutshell. Now let us look at it in some detail.
A. The Danish War: 1864-1865
Liberal sentiment in Germany had always been stirred by a desire to separate
Schleswig-Holstein from Denmark. The liberals called for a repudiation of
international agreements by Prussia (such as the 1852 Protocol which put
the Danish issue on ice) , while Bismarck declared in the Diet that he would
not be a party to a breach of international obligations. So Bismarck made
an agreement with Austria, the avowed enemy of German unity, to proceed
within the context of the 1852 Protocol"
The two powers then sent an ultimatum to Denmark on January 16, 1864 demanding
a withdrawal of the constitution of Nov. 18 (which incorporated Schleswig
in Denmark) within 48 hours or face military action. Denmark, counting on
the support of the European Powers, rejected the ultimatum" France
hesitated to join England, which refused to act alone. So the powers did
nothing. An attempt at mediation also failed. Denmark was therefore reduced
to submission by Prussian and Austrian military force.
In the Treaty of Gastein (Aug. 1865) Prussia and Austria decided how to
dispose of the acquired duchies. The two powers decided to rule the two
duchies jointly, with Austria administering Holstein and Prussia administering
Schleswig. Prussia was given certain military roads through Holstein and
command of Kiel, which was to be a port of the German Confederation. Both
duchies were compelled to join the Zollverein, which was of course to Prussia's
benefit since she controlled the customs union for all practical purposes.
But that was not all; Prussia also annexed Lauenburg, although she paid
a price of 2.5 million thaler for it. The German claimant to the throne
of the two duchies, Augustenberg, was completely ignored. All this seemed
fair enough, although Prussia obviously got the better end of the stick.
But Bismarck had no intention of leaving things as they were. It is surprising
that the statesmen of Austria did not see this.
B. The Prusso-Austrian War: 1866
Bismarck believed that trouble and eventual war with Austria would be inevitable.
His entire policy from 1863 to 1866 was predicated on war with Austria.
He had made sure that Russia would not intervene when he Russia would not
intervene when he sympathized with Russia in crushing the Polish revolution
of 1863. Napoleon III was maneuvered into a favorable position by all kinds
of vague promises for territorial aggrandizement in 1865. An alliance with
Italy was made in April, 1866, through Napoleon's assistance, which stipulated
that Italy would come to the aid of Prussia if a war with Austria broke
out in three months. Bismarck also tried to get Bavarian support but failed.
It is interesting that not a single German state was with Prussia when the
war actually came. The liberal and progressive majority in the Prussian
diet was somewhat mollified after the Banish wag, but still actively opposed
to the government. Bismarck then adopted some Caesarism from Napoleon III
and Disreali.
He presented a plan to the Confederate Diet in April, 1866, which called
for the acceptance of the 1849 electoral laws, including universal equal
and secret ballot. It was a tactical move to embarrass Austria since he
knew Austria would oppose the planned reform. He really believed that universal
suffrage would work to his advantage, hoping that the clergy and the landowners
would be able to win the peasants to the conservative side. The growth of
the worker movement would also help since Lasalle was the chief enemy of
the liberals, whose main support came from the upper bourgeoisie. In fact
Bismarck and Lasalle had several important talks which increased Bismarck's
confidence that his gambit would work.
Bismarck then moved towards the showdown by accusing Austria of arming and
troop movements in Bohemia. He called it "seditious agitation"
and further accused Austria of supporting the unlucky Augustenburg. Strangely
enough when the Prussian king put pressure on Vienna, Austria seemed willing
to disarm, but false rumors that Italy was arming scared Austria and moved
her in the opposite direction. So Austria mobilized first and at the same
time brought the various minor problems which had developed over Schleswig-Holstein
before the Federal Diet in order to gain the support of the other German
states. Bismarck immediately cried that this was a breach of the Gastein
Convention. When Austria shortly thereafter convoked the Holstein diet,
Prussian troops marched into Holstein. Austria called on the armies of the
Confederation to act against what it called illegal actions of Prussia in
Holstein.
Meanwhile Bismarck presented a new plan for the reorganization of the Confederation.
This was laid on the table about the same time that Bavaria proposed to
choose a commander for the Confederate armies and to mobilized the forces
of the smaller states. When the Bavarian proposal won by a vote of 9 to
6 the Prussian delegate declared the Confederation dissolved and the existence
of a state of war.
It was a quick war--three weeks in duration. Sadowa or Königgratz in
Bohemia was the crucial battle which turned into an easy victory for Prussia,
thanks to excellent organization and the famous new needle gun. The king,
who had been hesitant before now wanted to invade Austria, but Bismarck,
the ever-calculating diplomat, demurred. He knew the value of restraint.
He was not interested in crushing Austria but in removing her from German
politics. Baden and Württemberg were treated most leniently. Bavaria
was forced to sign a secret treaty to aid Prussia in any future war with
France.
The North German Confederation was formed by the annexation of various smaller
states and the unavoidable adhesion of some larger states north of the Main
river. The whole business was considered to be a revolution by most contemporary
observers. What the liberals bad dreamed of for five decades, Bismarck achieved
in three short weeks. Austria was permanently eliminated from German affairs.
Only some South German Catholic leaders and the socialists remained critical
of Bismarck. Success had turned most of his former enemies into friends
and admirers. The new Prussian diet elected on the day of the Battle of
Königgratz showed a decided shift to the Right. William claimed that
the victory was due to his army reforms.
An Indemnity Bill passed the new diet 230 to 75, with the Poles, Catholics
and Progressives voting against. This strange little maneuver legalized
the budgets of 1862 to 1864, allocated 154,000,000 thalers for 1866 and
confirmed the government promise to produce periodic expenditures and receipts
for money spent. A further vote of confidence on the conduct of foreign
affairs also passed 230 to 83. The memory of Bismarck's triumph was a powerful
factor in sapping the strength and vitality of German parliamentary life
for years to come.
C. The Franco-Prussian War: 1870-1871
But Germany was not yet fully unified. The South remained outside the fold
and here is where France and Napoleon III came into the picture. Napoleon
was vulnerable. He was forced to modify the traditional Richelieuan policy
toward Germany because of his nationalities doctrine. But Napoleon's policy
was still somewhat equivocal on German unification, as if he could not decide
which was more important his belief in national self-determination or to
keep France stronger than the new Germany would be. Bismarck however helped
him to decide when he outmaneuvered Napoleon on the Luxembourg and Belgian
issue. These disappointments plus the failure of the Mexican venture made
Napoleon determined to have some kind of diplomatic triumph.
French policy on the whole was jittery and erratic, reflecting Napoleon"s
uncertain position at home. French public opinion was not very militant.
Ollivier and Gramont, the chief political leaders, preferred peace, but
certain "statesmen" in France made mistakes. There were premature
threats of war, there were impudent demands made on the Germans (particularly
on July 12, 1870) and there was serious misinterpretation of French public
opinion. Nevertheless, he who thinks war is necessary is responsible for
it and Bismarck thought it was necessary to bring the South of Germany into
the union.
Now, strange as it may seem, the Franco-Prussian War actually began in Spain.
Queen Isabella was dethroned by a military coup in 1868. The Spanish parliament
then began to look for candidates to replace her. Prince Leopold von Hohenzollern-Sigmaringen
became one of the candidates. Bismarck was the prince's chief promoter,
since he believed it would bring on the war he had failed to trigger over
the Luxembourg affair of 1867. The news of Leopold's acceptance of the Spanish
crown hit France like a bombshell on July 2. Gramont, the foreign minister
made vague threats in the French Corp Legislatif: "We should know how
to do our duty."
On July 9 the French ambassador Benedetti interviewed King William who was
taking the bath at Bad Ems in Southwest Germany. The King apparently was
persuaded by Benedetti to force Leopold to retract his candidacy. So on
duly 12 Leopold retracts, being a good and obedient member of the Hohenzollern
family. Now the matter should have rested there. But the French began to
blunder and Bismarck's ingenuity fanned the embers of bad feeling into the
flame of war.
Gramont was not satisfied with Benedetti's accomplishment. So Bennedetti
was sent to see the king again and demand an unequivocal promise never to
allow Leopold to renew his candidacy. Gramont was out for a big diplomatic
triumph and so he played a game of tremendous risk, underestimating Bismarck's
cleverness. Benedetti tried to see the king again, but the latter refused
to grant him an audience. However, on duly 13 the king was taking a stroll
through the park when Benedetti suddenly materialized from among the trees
to accuse the king and make his demand for a definite promise. The king
politely refused to make such a promise. A report of the affair was sent
to Bismarck in Berlin by an official with the Kings's authority.
When Bismarck read this famous Ems Telegram he immediately saw his opportunity.
By clever abridgement of the Ems dispatch Bismarck achieved a terse and
sharply worded text which made it look like outright provocation on the
part of France. He had it published in the newspapers, saying that it would
have the effect of a red cloth upon the Gallic bull. That is exactly the
effect it had since the French considered the doctored telegram a provocation.
On duly 19 France declared war on the North German Confederation.
Only Bavaria hesitated for a moment in joining Bismarck:s war. Russia promised
neutrality. England became neutral when Bismarck published Benedetti's plan
for the annexation of Belgium which had been worked out with Bismarck.s
benign approval right after the Battle of Königsgratz. The war did
not last long. The fortress of Sedan fell on September 2, 1870 and the Emperor
Napoleon walked across the German lines with his hands high in the air.
Now a revolution broke out in Paris and Paris did not surrender until January
28, 1871. The Peace of Frankfurt was concluded on May 10.
France had to pay an indemnity of 5 billion francs. East Lorraine had to
be surrendered to Germany although Bismarck showed no great enthusiasm for
taking them until certain industrialists pointed out their economic and
hence military value. Northern France was occupied until 1873, when the
indemnity was completely paid.
On January 18, 1871 William was crowned as the Emperor of Germany in the
French Hall of Mirrors at Versailles. The Germans know how to add insult
to injury and thus lay the groundwork for future wars. Victor Hugo made
a profound prophesy at this time that France would retake Alsace and Lorraine
and even the Rhineland and make Germany a republic.
Send comments and questions to Professor
Gerhard Rempel, Western New England College.