The crucial importance of the presidency was emphasized in the
spring of 1932, when Hindenburg's term of office expired. The
old man, now in a state of mental and physical decline, wanted
to retire to Neudeck, his country estate, to end his days in peace.
Brüning insisted that he remain at the head of affairs, firmly
convince that Hindenburg was the only alternative to Hitler. Naturally
Brüning wished to avoid the excitement of a presidential
election at a time of nationalist ferment when the Nazi vote was
increasing at every Land election, so he tried to obtain the agreement
oft he parties to a constitutional amendment extending Hindenburg's
term of office to 1934.
Neither Hitler nor Hugenberg would agree to this expedient, and
reluctantly Hindenburg agreed to stand for re-election. That the
Socialists and Center supported him, while the German Nationalists
ran a candidate against him, greatly upset the old man, whose
sympathies lay completely on the right. After some initial hesitation
Hitler agreed to stand. On the eve of the election he hastily
assumed German citizenship by accepting the post of Regierungsrat
(government advisor) in the little Nazi-controlled Land of Brunswick.
A bitter and frenzied campaign ensued, marked by further street
violence. In effect it was a plebiscite for or against National
Socialism, a contest between the power of the streets and the
magic of an old warrior's name backed by the power of the Reichswehr.
On the second ballot in April 1932 Hindenburg received 19,359,000
votes, Hitler 13,418,000, and the Communist Thälmann, 3,706,000.
Though defeated, the Nazis had won a great moral victory. Since
1930 their vote had nearly doubled, and between the first and
second ballots Hitler succeeded in capturing an extra two million
votes. Nor had those republicans who reluctantly supported Hindenburg,
as the only alternative to a reign of lawlessness under Hitler,
much cause for congratulation. They had no guarantee that the
weary octogenarian would respect the spirit of the constitution
or display sound judgement in affairs of state. Within a matter
of weeks there was proof of his lack of political insight when
he dispensed with the services of his faithful and devoted chancellor
who had worked zealously to secure his re-election.
The resignation of Brüning in May was very largely the work
of Schleicher. In the course of 1931 Schleicher changed his mind
about Brüning, once it was clear that the latter had failed
to rally moderate opinion in defense of the presidential system.
As radical nationalism grew in strength, Schleicher concluded
that the only certain way of avoiding a Nazi uprising, likely
to strain the loyalties of the Reichswehr, was to come
to terms with Hitler and include him in a presidential cabinet
under a more right-wing chancellor. Immediately after the election
Brüning had yielded to pressure from several Länder,
notably Prussia, and banned the SA and SS as a serious danger
to state security. Schleicher was alarmed, not out of any respect
for these ill-disciplined rowdies, but simply because he feared
the reaction of the right wing to a ban on a nationalist organization.
The time had come, he decided, to end "the drift to the left"
and appoint a new chancellor who would show no favour to Socialists
but would do his best to prepare the ground for a rapprochement
with Hitler.
Looking back over the years, it is only too apparent that Schleicher
was a vain and self-confident intriguer, who grossly underestimated
the nature of the Nazi party, lightly assuming that it was a healthy
nationalist movement which he could tame and exploit by adroit
political manipulation. The general was digging his own grave
as he intrigued first against Groener, whom he forced to reign,
and then against Brüning. The president was already out of
sympathy with Brüning's policies and lent a ready ear tot
he advice of Schleicher, eagerly reinforced by his son Oskar von
Hindenburg. Early in May 1932 Schleicher overcame the president's
lingering doubts by informing him that Hitler had now agreed not
to oppose a new chancellor, on condition that the ban on SA and
SS was lifted and new elections were ordered.
The scene was set for Brüning's dismissal. Ironically enough,
the chancellor was confident that the tide was turning at last,
both at home and abroad. Well aware that his deflationary policies
had failed to cure unemployment, now topping the six million mark,
he was preparing cautiously to reflate the economy and had drafted
a program of public works, including proposals for the break-up
of some inefficient East Prussian estates and the resettlement
of 600,000 unemployed on them. Landowning circles got wind of
this and their spokesman, Oldenburg-Januschau, visited Hindenburg
at Neudeck and easily persuaded the disgruntled president that
Brüning was an "agrarian bolshevik" bent on socializing
agriculture. When Brüning appeared with new emergency decrees
the old man refused to sign, and insisted on the formation of
a more right-wing cabinet. Brüning was deeply offended by
Hindenburg's ingratitude when the government was allegedly "only
a hundred meters from the goal," with reparations and disarmament
likely to be resolved in Germany's favor. Characteristically,
he made only a half-hearted attempt to justify himself, meekly
tendering his resignation and that of his cabinet, which was at
once accepted.
The fall of Brüning was a turning-point in these critical
years. His dependence on Hindenburg hardly compensated for his
lack of tactical ability and mass appeal. And though his deflationary
policies contributed materially tot he abolition of reparations,
they did so only by deepening the domestic crisis. Still, Brüning
was a man of integrity and a deeply patriotic German who won the
respect of foreign statesmen. And once he had departed the prospects
for the survival of even a mildly authoritarian regime suddenly
looked much bleaker.
The eight months which came between the resignation of Brüning
and the appointment of Hitler as chancellor were full of feverish
political activity and complex political maneuvering. There could
be no clearer sign of the bankruptcy of the political system than
the appointment of Franz von Papen as chancellor. A charming and
accomplished socialite and close friend of Schleicher, Papen was
a Westphalian aristocrat with industrial connections, a former
general-staff officer in the old Prussian army, a Catholic with
authoritarian views, a crafty intriguer certainly, but a man of
little political insight or stature.
A storm of disapproval greeted his government of "national
concentration," which represented the interests of business
men and landowners so blatantly that contemporaries dubbed it
"the cabinet of barons." The left was automatically
against Papen. The center bitterly hostile to the man who had
ousted Brüning. Event he nationalists were annoyed because
Papen had been preferred to Hugenberg. And much to his surprise
Schleicher discovered that Hitler was not a man of his word. Despite
Hitler's promise, the Nazis attacked Papen as they had attacked
Brüning before him. Clearly there was no hope of the Reichstag's
"tolerating" Papen as it "tolerated" Brüning.
So fresh elections were ordered at once and, in accordance with
Schleicher's promise to Hitler, the ban on the SA was lifted,
a step which resulted in a new wave of street violence sweeping
through Germany in the high summer of 1932.
To curry favor with the right wing before going to the polls,
and also to strengthen the government's hand vis-a-vis Hitler
by securing control of the police in the largest German state,
Schleicher and Papen decided on a coup d'état to unseat
the Prussian government. For years the extreme right had resented
the Socialist-Center government which had made Prussia a bulwark
of the Weimar system. In April 1932 local elections destroyed
the "red-black" majority, but as Nazis, Communists and
Nationalists were not likely to reach agreement, the Braun-Severing
government remained in office on a caretaker basis.
On 20 July 1932 Papen declared a state of emergency in Prussia,
appointed himself Reichskommissar, and dismissed the Prussian
ministers on the grounds that they had favored the Communists
and had failed to prevent fresh street violence (for which Papen's
raising of the ban on the SA was to blame). Neither Centrists
nor Socialists were prepared to resist Papen. The Socialists acquiesced
in the situation, as their predecessors had done when Stresemann
struck at Saxony in 1923. One police captain and five men sufficed
to remove Socialist ministers from office in the most industrialized
and powerful Land in Germany.
Of course they made out a compelling case for inaction. Resistance
would have led to useless bloodshed because the Reichswehr, the
Stahlhelm and the Nazis would have been thrown into battle against
them, and the SA might well have seized power in the general confusion.
There were legal doubts whether a mere caretaker government would
be justified in offering resistance at all. Nor did it make sense
to call a general strike with six million men unemployed. Instead
the Socialists turned to the Supreme Court and sought an injunction
against Papen. "I have been a democrat for forty years and
I am not going to become a condottiere now" remarked Minister-president
Braun, as he rejected suggestions that he lead the resistance
to Papen. An understandable attitude perhaps, in the light of
the party's traditions of non-violence, rational discussion and
peaceful evolution.
But whatever may be said for or against the decision of Braun
and Severing and their trade-union colleagues, one thing is quite
certain. The cause of democracy suffered a mortal blow when the
Prussian government capitulated without a struggle. Papen followed
up the coup d'état with a thorough purge of the Prussian
civil service. Many loyal republican officials were retired and
the Land completely integrated with the Reich.
The Prussian coup d'état pleased the right wing, but it
did not enable Papen to woo nationalist support away from Hitler
at the elections on July 31, 1932. The Populists lost over one
million votes, the German nationalists nearly 300,000, whereas
the Nazi vote actually showed a slight increase on that of the
presidential election. With 13,745,000 votes the Nazis held 230
seats in the Reichstag. As leader of what was by far the largest
party, Hitler had a constitutional right to try and form a government.
Schleicher and Papen agreed that he must come into their cabinet.
The difficulty was Hitler, who was in a thoroughly intransigent
mood, confident (as he had every reason to be) of ultimate victory
in the near future. Called to the palace for consultations, he
bluntly demanded full powers for his party.
The president was unimpressed by "the Bohemian corporal,"
refused to offer him more than inclusion in a presidential cabinet
and warned him to exercise more control over lawless elements
in the Nazi party - shortly after the election Papen had been
obliged to impose the death penalty for political murders and
to set up special courts to deal with political offences. Hitler
rejected Hindenburg's offer out of hand, but as he had no intention
of seizing power, despite much wild talk, the political deadlock
was complete.
When the Reichstag met in September 1932 Papen, well aware that
he had no hope of success, promptly dissolved it, but not before
Goering, newly elected Reichstag president, had humiliated him
by allowing the deputies to carry a motion of no confidence in
the Papen government by 512 votes to 42, a sufficient comment
on Papen's unpopularity in the Reichstag and in the country as
a whole.
The election on November 6, 1932 did not resolve the deadlock.
But it revealed a significant fall in the Nazi vote. This time
they polled only 11,730,000 votes - a loss of two millions - and
returned with 196 seats. The decline, which was confirmed at subsequent
Land elections, was due at least in part tot he fact that Papen's
withdrawal from the Disarmament conference, until Germany was
conceded equality in armaments, had impressed nationalist opinion
- for the first time since 1924 the German nationalists increased
their vote by almost 800,000 and returned with fifty-two instead
of thirty-seven seats.
This time Hitler was desperately short of funds and fighting hard
for every vote. Some of the more restless supporters were undoubtedly
disillusioned by the leader's failure to seize power in August
and drifted over to the extreme left - this was partly the reason
why the Communist vote increased by 700,000 to a total of nearly
six millions, giving them 100 seats in the Reichstag. Some middle-class
supporters were probably scared away by Hitler's vain attempts
to capture the working-class vote. The Nazis reviled the Papen
cabinet as "a class government of reactionaries" and
actually collaborated with the Communists during the Berlin transport
strike which paralyzed the great city in early November.
What Papen might have made of this changing political situation
will never be known, for in November he fell victim to another
Schleicher intrigue. As Papen had no support in the Reichstag,
apart from nationalists and Populists, he tendered his resignation,
a purely tactical maneuver, for he assumed that Hitler would not
be able to form a government and that Hindenburg would then reinstate
his old friend in office. As expected, Hitler still insisted on
plenary powers which the president refused to give him. So Papen
re-emerged from the wings, this time with a new plan. he proposed
to declare martial law, dissolve the Reichstag, postpone elections
and rule by decree until the constitution had been amended along
authoritarian lines and the reflationary program given time to
work.
Hindenburg was willing enough to support Papen in this but Schleicher
was not. He believed that he could divide the Nazi party and cut
off a section of some sixty deputies led by the left-wing National
Socialist Gregor Strasser. With their support and the backing
of sympathetic trade-union elements in the Socialist and Center
parties, where he had been taking soundings, Schleicher hoped
to build a Reichstag majority for a progressive social program
within the framework of the constitution. While Hindenburg hesitated,
Schleicher played an ace. He informed the cabinet that Papen's
policy would lead to civil war, a general strike and probably
a Polish invasion. To defend Germany against several perils simultaneously
was simply beyond the Reichswehr's capacity. When Papen now tried
to have Schleicher dismissed, Hindenburg refused and with tears
rolling down his cheeks allowed "little Franz" to depart.
On December 2, 1932 Schleicher became German chancellor, rather
reluctantly, as he would have much preferred to continue his intrigues
behind cover. Nothing went right for him in office. It was soon
apparent that he had grossly over-estimated his ability to divide
the Nazis. Strasser was easily outmaneuvered by Hitler, who reasserted
his control over the party and nipped signs of rebellion in the
bud. Then Schleicher approached the left with a program of public
works, price-fixing, restoration of wage- and relief-cuts, and
land resettlement in East Prussia, measures which naturally turned
the right wing against him. But he could not overcome the mistrust
of Socialists and Centrists and had finally to return tot he presidential
palace to take up where Papen left off. Admitting that he could
not obtain a majority in the Reichstag, Schleicher proposed to
dissolve it, declare a state of emergency, ban the Nazis and Communists
and postpone elections indefinitely.
The role of industry in the winter of 1932-3 in ousting Schleicher
and helping Hitler to power has been the subject of much controversy.
In the boom years German industry had been uninterested in the
Nazis. What support Hitler received before 1932 came from mavericks
such as Fritz Thyssen and Emil Kirdorf. Industry was deeply suspicious
of the anti-capitalist veneer of Nazism. In October 1930 just
after their spectacular electoral victory the newly arrived Nazi
deputies introduced a bill to nationalize banks and control interest
rates which Hitler obliged them to withdraw. Over the next two
years as the crisis deepened Hitler - who had no interest whatsoever
in socialism - redoubled his efforts to win industrial support
but without success. Industrialists preferred Brüning and
Papen to Hitler. Consequently, far from being in the "pocket
of big business," the Nazis were desperately short of funds
from June 1932 to January 1933, as Goebbels lamented in his diary.
Certainly some (but not all) leading figures in the cartelized
coal and steel industries, which were in dire trouble, sympathized
with the Nazis. for the latter promised to destroy parliamentary
government, smash the trade unions (ensuring that wage-levels
remained low) and dismantle the welfare system (lowering the employers'
social contributions). Possibly Schleicher's willingness to cooperate
with the trade unions, introduce labor legislation and public
works program putting money in the hands of municipalities not
big business worried industrialists. But this turned them not
to Hitler but back to Papen. Recent research suggests that although
much of industry was ready enough to tolerate a Hitler cabinet
and had little love for Weimar, nevertheless, heavy industry exerted
only marginal influence on Hitler's appointment.
More important in this deadlocked political situation caused by
the Reichstag's unwillingness to assume responsibility and by
the unwillingness of both Nazis and Communists to seize power
was the influence exerted by the president's political advisers.
"Little Franz" was working assiduously to encompass
Schleicher's downfall. Hugenberg's decision to support a Hitler
cabinet was equally crucial. When Hitler, worried by signs of
disaffection in his own ranks, decided to accept office in a Nationalist-Nazi
cabinet provided he became chancellor the intrigue moved forward.
Papen, a frequent and welcome visitor to Hindenburg's house, persuaded
the old man that a viable alternative to Schleicher now existed.
The Nazis and Nationalists would have a reasonable chance of obtaining
a majority in the Reichstag. And the fact that Hitler seemed prepared
to share power and had broken with the "left wing" Nazi
Otto Strasser reassured Hindenburg. On top of Papen's promptings
came pressure from landowners alarmed by the plans of the "socialist
general."
The Landbund went into action accusing Schleicher, like
Brüning, of "agrarian bolshevism," a serious charge
in Hindenburg's mind. Disturbing rumor were circulating that the
budget committee of the Reichstag had uncovered evidence of misuse
of public money given to inefficient landowners under the Osthilfe.
It was even alleged that relatives of the president were implicated,
although whether this influenced Oskar von Hindenburg's decision
to press Hitler's candidature on his father is uncertain. The
Reichswehr inclined to Hitler's side. General von Hammerstein,
the commander-in-chief, thought Hitler preferable to another Papen
government whilst General von Blomberg, commander in East Prussia
and the soldier earmarked for minister of defense in the new cabinet,
reflected the views of younger officers in his enthusiastic advocacy
oft he Nazi cause.
Whatever the decisive factor may have been, the old man determined
to be rid of Schleicher. So when the general requested emergency
powers at the end of January, Hindenburg turned him down. had
not the chancellor argued seven weeks before that a military dictatorship
meant civil war? There was nothing left for Schleicher but resignation
on January 28, 1933.
On January 30, 1933 Hindenburg received Hitler in audience and
appointed him chancellor. That night and into the early morning
Hitler stood on the chancellery balcony in salute as a huge torchlight
procession of 100,000 excited supporters marched past in triumph,
singing the Horst Wessel song. This was a great hour for the rank
and file. All the efforts of a handful of reactionary advisers
in the presidential palace had failed to keep the leader from
power. At last the long-awaited "National Revolution"
would begin.
In fact Hitler did not stand alone. A hundred meters away a slightly
bewildered Hindenburg stood at an open window oft he presidential
palace as the precession passed. It was a timely reminder that
Hitler had not seized power. He had come to office by a sordid
backstairs intrigue and with the president's consent. he was chancellor,
but in a government of "national concentration," surrounded
by such orthodox reactionaries as Hugenburg and Seldte of the
Stahlhelm. There were in fact only two Nazis in the cabinet, Frick,
minister of the interior, and Goering, minister without portfolio
and Prussian minister of the interior. Papen, vice-chancellor
in the new cabinet, was elated by the success of his intrigue,
believing that he had taken Hitler prisoner and succeeded where
Brüning and Schleicher failed. "In two months we'll
have pushed Hitler into a corner so hard that he'll be squeaking,"
Papen boasted to a friend.