In the election of 1969, the SPD won 224 seats, the CDU 193, the
CSU 49 and the FDP 30. To the general relief, the NPD only obtained
4.5 percent of the votes and remained unrepresented in the Bundestag.
The support which they received in the southern Länder failed
to outweigh their weakness in the north and above all in North
Rhine-Westphalia. Although the FDP had only won its presence in
the Bundestag by the narrow margin of O.8 percent, it could decide
the character of the new government.
After three weeks of negotiation, Brandt obtained 251 out of 496
votes, with 3 FDP deputies abstaining. Scheel became foreign minister
and Genscher minister of the interior. Schiller remained minister
of economics. Helmut Schmidt became minister of defence, while
his previous post as leader of the SPD parliamentary group was
assumed by Herbert Wehner. Wehner's strategy for obtaining power
through a Great Coalition had been triumphantly vindicated, though
only because the FDP had changed sides.
The election marked the close of a chapter in German politics.
The Federal Republic got a president and a chancellor who had
been actively associated with the resistance to the Nazis. Brandt
said as the results came in that "tonight, finally and for
ever, Hitler lost the war." This may sound unfair to Adenauer
and Erhard, but both had been more willing to be reconciled with
ex-Nazis than with the full consequences of defeat. For the next
three years Brandt's position was precarious, but he had on his
side "comrade trend." In each of the elections of 1965,
1969 and 1972 the SPD share of the vote grew by 3.1 percent.
Brandt described himself as "a chancellor of inner reforms,"
but in practice he was able to achieve disappointingly few domestic
reforms. Some were blocked by the FDP, most notable the extension
of workers' co-determination from coal and steel to the whole
of industry. Yet the Plant Constitution Law of 1972 extended the
range of matters over which management was required to consult
Works Councils.
Other reforms, particularly in taxation, required the cooperation
of Land governments, whose suspicion of the center was reinforced
in half of them by CDU/CSU participation in their ministries.
Schemes to benefit the weak and poor had to be shelved for lack
of cash. Social reforms (e.g. divorce and abortion) might be cheap,
but were controversial and needed approval by the Federal Council.
The Kiesinger government left the Mark to float. After it had
done so for 26 days, the Brandt government fixed its value again
8.5 percent higher. This revealed fidelity to a free market system,
by a country with an unusually low rate of inflation and a bias
towards exports, particularly of capital goods. The public's readiness
to cooperate in keeping prices down, increased the competitiveness
of German goods abroad and swelled the export surplus. Unless
the Mark's value was continually adjusted upwards in compensation,
foreign demand for Marks increased the money supply, and threatened
to cancel out the achievements of domestic restraint. West Germany
had become so dependent on exports, that she could not afford
to isolate herself from the outside world.
Schiller had hoped to balance revaluation by relaxing credit,
at the same time as the rise in their prices discouraged sales
of German goods abroad. This strategy assumed that goods made
for export could be equally well disposed of domestically. In
reality any extra home demand would more probably have been in
other directions, e.g. consumer goods and services. So, for the
policy to succeed, a long-term shift in resources would have been
needed. Moreover, the revaluation came too late, or was not big
enough, to shield the economy from inflation outside.
Between the fall of 1969 and the spring of 1971 prices rose at
an annual rate of 4.5 percent. This imported inflation was reinforced
by a "home-made" variety. The unions, feeling that their
moderation had been exploited, insisted on wage rises which outstripped
productivity. The Federal Bank and the public demanded controls,
halting expansion at home, while the continued ability of exporters
to make profits abroad removed the incentive to shift their sales
efforts. Yet, if in the struggle against inflation, interest rates
were pushed too high, employment might suffer and unwelcome foreign
money be drawn in. The federal policy-makers had to pick a precarious
path between risking inflation and risking unemployment.
Even if there had been more room for manoeuvre at home, the lion's
share of attention during these years would have gone to foreign
affairs, namely relations with the communist world. Not that relations
with the West were neglected. Brandt repeatedly emphasized that
conciliation with the East was only possible for a Republic securely
integrated with the West. At a prime ministers' meeting at the
Hague in December 1969, he played a leading part in opening the
way for Britain to join the Common Market.
A. "Regulated neighborliness"
In his declaration of policy, he expressed the wish to prevent
a further "growing apart" between the two German Republics,
so that "regulated neighborliness" could operate. He
made no mention of reunification or sole representation, or the
Hallstein Doctrine. He described the DDR as a state, though adding
that, if there were two German states, their relationship must
be of a special kind, as was the case between members of the British
Commonwealth.
Moscow soon accepted the offer to negotiate an undertaking that
neither the Federal Republic nor the Soviet Union would attack
one another. Warsaw, meanwhile, had agreed to talks on Polish-West
German relations. Both sets of negotiations started early in 1970.
They proved detailed and laborious, but not wholly unpromising.
The man at the brakes was Walter Ulbricht. This last-surviving
Stalinist had long been holding together the inhabitants of his
Republic by presenting them with a picture of an unregenerate,
revengeful and dangerous next-door neighbor. Brandt seemed set
on depriving this presentation of its credibility.
An East German draft for a Treaty was sent to Bonn. It began by
insisting on the DDR being recognized as a foreign state in international
law. This was the one thing which Brandt had declared to be impossible.
It went on to demand, virtually, that the Federal Republic leave
NATO and the EEC. The terms were impossible for Brandt to accept,
and seemed deliberately intended to provoke a refusal. Realizing
that such a reaction would be exploited to put the blame on him,
Brandt carefully refrained from making it, but instead reiterated
his desire to negotiate.
At this point the advantage of dealing with the Soviet Union,
Poland and East Germany simultaneously was demonstrated. The talks
in Moscow and Warsaw went forward too well for Ulbricht to be
able to rely on them breaking down. But if they were going to
succeed, Ulbricht could not afford to be the only man left out.
Accordingly. Brandt was invited to visit East Germany.
B. Meetings at Erfurt and Kassel
On 19 March 1970 Brandt met Stoph, the GDR prime minister, at
Erfurt in the East. The most remarkable feature of the visit was
a silent but unmistakable demonstration of welcome by the population.
Whereas the Eastern Willi repeated the demand for full recognition,
the Western Willy emphasized the need to mitigate the human hardships
caused by partition. But the only thing on which they could agree
was to meet again at Kassel in the West on 21 May. At Kassel there
were noisy demonstrations from both neo-Nazis and Communists.
Both sides decided that a pause for thought was advisable.
C. Russia and Poland
In the Kremlin, however, desire for better relations with the
West was gaining the upper hand. The idea was floated of the general
Security Conference, which was to meet in Helsinki. But the western
governments stood firmly together in saying that a German settlement
must come first. With great dexterity a formula was evolved to
which both Bonn and Moscow could agree. So, in August 1970, a
Treaty of Non-Aggression was signed.
Both sides promised to "promote the normalization of the
situation in Europe..." They agreed "to acknowledge
that peace can only be maintained if nobody infringes the present
borders" and to "respect without reservation the territorial
integrity of all states in Europe" in their borders of today.
The Oder-Neisse line and the FRG-GDR frontier was described as
"inviolable." The Russians agreed that the Treaty did
not close the door to reunification by agreement, but only to
the possibility of one side imposing it on the other.
The Federal Republic was also authorized to tell the United States,
Britain and France that in the opinion of both signatories the
Treaty did not affect the rights and responsibilities in Germany,
particularly in Berlin, of the four occupying powers. Finally
the Russians were given to understand that the Treaty's ratification
would depend on a Four-Power Agreement being reached about Berlin.
An unmentioned attraction of the Treaty for the Russians was undoubtedly
the prospect of easier access to German credits, industrial skills
and equipment. The preparatory negotiations had been given a "sweetener"
in the shape of a contract for oil pipes on favorable terms.
The Bonn government insisted that prime responsibility for Berlin
rested with the Four Powers, but an agreement failed to emerge.
The impediment became clear when, at the end of April 1971, Ulbricht
was "promoted" to a honorific post. It was not only
in West Germany that there had to be a change of leadership, before
an agreement could be reached. Ulbricht's successor, Erich Honecker,
was to prove almost as obdurate, but at the outset was too insecure
to frustrate Moscow's wishes.
D. The Four-Power Agreement on Berlin
Two months later the ambassadors announced what was in effect
a compromise. The three Western zones had stood out for what became
known as the three Zs: 1. Zugang, i.e. unimpeded movement between
West Berlin and West Germany for West Berliners and West Germans
as well as for Americans, British and French; 2. Zutritt, i.e.
the extension to West Berliners of the facilities allowing West
Germans to visit East Germany; and 3. Zuordnung, i.e. recognition
by the East of the fact that West Berlin was tied to West Germany
(as against the East German thesis that it was merely a special
enclave in the territory of the GDR). The three demands were recognized
in the agreement.
The three Western governments declared, however, that "the
ties between the western sectors of Berlin and the Federal Republic
of Germany would be maintained and developed, taking into account
that these sectors continue not to be a constituent part of the
Federal Republic and are not to be governed by it." The last
24 words corresponded with the position which the Allies had steadily
maintained over West Berlin. But they contradicted the West German
position, as stated in the Basic Law and the West Berlin Constitution.
The Federal Convention to elect the president was not to meet
in West Berlin, while the Bundestag and Bundesrat and their committees
could only do so to discuss matters directly affecting West Berlin.
On the other hand representatives of West Berlin might continue
to sit but not vote in both bodies and West German laws could
still apply in the city, provided they had been adopted by the
Senate of West Berlin. The Federal Republic was authorized to
act for West Berlin in dealings with foreign countries. Federal
institutions, such as the Cartel Office, already established in
the city, might stay there. Finally the Russians were allowed
to open a consulate in West Berlin to deal with the commanders
of the Western forces. This implied that they no longer had any
responsibility themselves for governing the area, whereas their
retention of such a responsibility in East Berlin was their justification
in international law for being in the city.
The Four- Power agreement was supplemented four months later by
three separate inter-German ones. Between them the documents amounted
to little more than a confirmation of the status quo, but gave
to that status a precision which it had hitherto lacked.
E. The Politics of Ratification
To work out such a package deal was a considerable achievement.
Though Brandt had left the details to Egon Bahr, it was his determination
to reach a settlement which led to compromise. The package could
still be frustrated if the Bundestag refused ratification. The
CDU/CSU were of course hostile. They complained that the vital
cards which West Germany held for bargaining, refusal to recognize
the 1945 settlement, had been played without anything being gained.
The SPD answer was that after 25 years the settlement was so well
established as to deprive the refusal to recognize it of almost
all political value. The only way to improve relations was to
behave reasonably and hope for reasonable reactions.
A great deal thus depended on the FDP. The party had showed up
badly in Land elections early in 1970. Its right wing attributed
this to the FDP's association with Socialist policies. In October
Mende and two other deputies went over openly to the CDU. With
the government's majority thus reduced to six, the doubts expressed
by three more FDP deputies became a crucial matter. #Parliamentary
discussion of the agreements began late in 1971 and the crucial
vote was due in the following April. Kiesinger's skill in reaching
compromises was less of an asset when the CDU shifted into opposition
and he had been succeeded as leader by Rainer Barzel, a nimble
tactician and articulate critic. In April Barzel seems to have
thought that the FDP deputies could be persuaded to defect and
therefore tabled for the first time in the history of the Republic
a "constructive vote of no confidence." While demonstrations
in favour of the agreements filled the streets, most of the SPD
deputies abstained from voting. On 27 April the motion obtained
247 votes against 10, two short of the absolute majority. Three
deputies abstained and two FDP ones voted for the motion, so that
at least one CDU or CSU Deputy must have voted against it.
Just over a year later, a newspaper viewed as the culprit a none-too-reputable
CSU deputy. Further investigative journalism strongly suggested
that he had received some $25,000 as an inducement from an SPD
whip, Karl Wienand. The latter denied the story and was shielded
by Wehner, so that a Bundestag inquiry failed to reach any conclusion.
In another scandal, Wienand was shown not to be truthful and a
few years later had to resign. The episode left an unpleasant
taste. But there were equally strong stories in the fall of 1972,
that bribery had been used by the opposition to induce some of
the FDP desertions.
Barzel's fiasco did not improve the opposition's prospect of defeating
the treaties. The Russians made clear that no regime responsible
for frustrating the settlement could expect any cooperation from
them. West Germany's NATO allies left no doubt of their desire
for ratification. Opinion polls suggested that a majority of West
German voters were ready to accept it. The alternative to ratification
would not be a return to the 1970 position, but to something more
strained in which the chances of getting alleviations for the
inhabitants of the DDR would be minimal.
Barzel accordingly negotiated with Brandt and Scheel a declaration
"interpreting" the treaties in a way which left a door
open for the German nation as a whole to be free at some date
in the future. The Russians raised no objection to the declaration.
Barzel had originally intended that his followers should, on the
strength of the declaration, vote for the treaties. But some of
them objected so strongly that he had to be content with their
abstention.
So, on May 17 the Treaty with the USSR was accepted by 248 votes
to 10 and that with Poland by 248 votes to 17. The Bundesrat decided
to abandon opposition and the Brandt Ostpolitik could thus take
effect. Barzel had hardly cut an impressive figure, but the real
blame for defeat must rest with the backwoodsmen of his party
and still more with Strauss and the CSU. They had refused to face
up to the consequences of a lost war and had shut their minds
to the political realities outside Germany. But some blame attaches
to the Americans and British who, in their anxiety to secure West
German support in the Cold War, had encouraged such intransigence
and given a false impression of the extent to which they would
support it.
While the treaties had been passed, the Bundestag remained in
deadlock. The natural way out was a dissolution followed by an
election. But the Basic Law provided that a chancellor could only
ask for a dissolution if defeated on a vote of confidence. He
could do it provided that the Bundestag did not with a majority
of its members vote confidence in an alternative chancellor. But
if the opposition were strong enough to defeat a motion of confidence,
what would stop them from using their strength to vote Barzel
into power.
Barzel at first refused to make any promises as to what he would
do if Brandt, in order to secure a dissolution, engineered his
own party's defeat. But the opposition would then have come into
office, if at all, with as tenuous a majority. The disadvantages
of taking power in such circumstances were so clear as to induce
Brandt to take the risk. By the time the Bundestag went on its
summer holidays, an election in the autumn was taken for granted.
Before it occurred, however, a distraction was created by Karl
Schiller, the minister of economics. Schiller had become increasingly
high-handed and made himself unloved by most of his colleagues
and the French government. In the summer of 1971 the finance minister,
frustrated by his inability to secure desirable but drastic reforms
in the taxation system, was provoked by a dispute with Schiller
into resigning.
Brandt, to ensure a unified economic policy, invited Schiller
to take over the Finance Ministry, while keeping his own. This
made him to all appearances the second most powerful man in the
cabinet. In 1972 a fresh wave of prosperity renewed the need to
choose between risking more inflation and risking more unemployment.
Schiller staked his position on the former and the general view
was that the government would not be able to afford his resignation.
But the governor of the Federal Bank persuaded the other ministers
to restrict instead the freedom of foreigners to increase inflation
by buying German securities. Brandt put up no fight for his "super-minister"
and Schiller resigned. He was replaced in his double function
by Helmut Schmidt, whose record at the ministry of defence had
greatly enhanced his reputation. The expected crisis of economic
confidence did not occur.
A. The East-West Basic Treaty
In the meantime negotiations had been proceeding in Berlin between
the two German Republics. On 8 November a Basic Treaty between
them was initialled. It was described as taking for its point
of departure "historical facts" without prejudice to
the differing views of the signatories on fundamental questions,
including the national one. The two governments declared
1. that they would develop good relationships with one another on the basis of equal rights,
2. that they would solve their disagreements only by peaceful means,
3. that present frontiers were inviolable both now and in the future, and
4. that neither would interfere in the affairs of the other.
They affirmed their intention to abide by the principles of the
Charter, in particular the sovereign equality of all states, respect
for independence, autonomy and territorial integrity, the right
of self determination, the protection of human rights and nondiscrimination.
They would proceed on the assumption that neither of the two states
could represent the other internationally or act in its name.
They undertook to conclude further detailed agreements on such
matters as science, traffic, postal communications, health, sports
and environmental protection. The exchange of permanent representatives,
(rather than ambassadors) was also provided. Both sides agreed
to apply for membership of the United Nations.
The basis on which settlements had been reached with Russia and
Poland was thus extended to inter-German relations. The Federal
Republic, except that it did not explicitly "recognize"
the other state, abandoned almost completely the positions which
it had been maintaining since its creation. The Democratic Republic
on the other hand gave up its insistence on being explicitly recognized
as a foreign state in international law, though continuing to
maintain that it was one. B. Brand and SPD win "no confidence"
West German voters were thus enabled to go to the polls with their
eyes open. For at the end of September Brandt tabled a motion
of confidence. When the time came to vote on it, he refrained
in common with the other ministers from supporting his own government.
The opposition mustered their full strength, with the result that
the motion was rejected by 248 votes to 233. This extraordinary
manoeuvre, made necessary by the fact that the Basic Law had been
designed for a Republic with many rather than with few parties,
opened the way for the president to dissolve the Bundestag.
In a 91 percent poll on 19 November 1972, the CDU, even taken
in combination with the CSU, found itself replaced as strongest
party by the SPD, winning only 225 seats as against 229. The FDP
rose from 30 seats to 42; the NPD only obtained O.6 percent of
the poll. Brandt may have been described by his critics as the
"chancellor of renunciation" but his policy of facing
unpalatable realities had been endorsed by the West German people.
The man who had been overshadowed by Adenauer in 1961, and by
Erhard in 1965, had so improved his stature by his performance
in office that he put Barzel into the background.
As happens so often, triumph soon turned sour. His party's unity
was threatened, reform at home remained elusive, and the results
of the Ostpolitik fell short of expectations.
A. Domestic Reform
1. The Jusos
After the unrest of 1968, the more moderate young intellectuals
decided to set out on "the long march through the institutions,"
to win a position where they could effect reforms peacefully.
The old-established members of the party were lethargic by comparison
and baffled by the sociological jargon in which they now found
political arguments being clothed. The young socialists (Jusos)
thus gained a prominence disproportionate to their numbers and
dominated the organization to which every SPD member under 35
automatically belonged.
The Jusos' support for the Ostpolitik had been welcome, but their
concentration on internal problems proved less so. They were not
content with modifying the existing order of society, but wanted
to sweep it away. Their ideal was a society which in all its manifestations,
political, economic, and social, was controlled by the rank-and-file.
Whether liberty or equality should come first was not a question
they cared to discuss.
The SPD, however, would never have achieved their victories of
1969 and 1972, if they had not junked their tradition as a Marxist
party. By becoming a popular party of pragmatic reform, they won
a substantial proportion of the "middle ground." This
middle ground included the more affluent workers - the "new
bourgeoisie." The Jusos were challenging this transformation
and thereby alienating the essential middle vote.
There was the further danger of estranging the FDP. This party
believed that the extra votes won in 1972 had come from people
who wanted a government which was neither reactionary nor radical
and looked to them to hold the SPD left wing in check. As one
of them put it, "the economic system may not be a sacred
cow but neither is it a lamb waiting for slaughter." In the
past German parties had resolved their internal quarrels by splitting.
The damage this did to good government had brought the 5 percent
rule into existence. But if parties are not to split, then they
must act as umbrellas sheltering a variety of views. This is a
situation unpalatable to enthusiasts.
To the Jusos the SPD was the dominant partner in the Coalition
and as such entitled to decide its policies. They discounted the
danger of the FDP changing partners again on the ground that another
turnabout would do the party such discredit as to bring it below
the 5 percent line. They argued further that for a progressive
party to stop introducing changes meant stagnation, which would
soon lead to votes being lost to parties more on the left.
Brandt saw the force of this argument. He had done his best to
reduce the gulf of distrust between the generations. He did not
wish such success as he had achieved to be dissipated. He described
the Jusos as "the salt in our soup." "We must see
that they don't make it too salty." He exerted himself, as
did Wehner, to keep the enthusiasm of the left wing harnessed
to the party's cause. As a result he was accused by the right
wing, and still more by the opposition, of weakness in the face
of crypto-communism.
2. The CDU/CSU camp
The atmosphere in the CDU/CSU camp was hardly more harmonious.
A familiar struggle was in progress between those who argued that
the election had been lost by too much moderation and those who
argued that the mistake had lain in not being moderate enough.
Strauss reacted to the defeat by calling for "the helmet
to be bound on more firmly." He believed that the way to
attract votes was to be more aggressive. He denied that the government
had settled the German problem-and events soon began to suggest
that he was right. He argued that a lasting solution could only
be found within a European context, by bringing about a federation
embracing the whole of Europe.
How far Strauss was in earnest is hard to say. He has been described
as one of those tragic figures who cannot find the place in history
to which their abilities entitle them. He has seemed unable to
reconcile himself to the fact that the causes in which he has
invested his emotions are not those which a majority of his fellow-countrymen
are prepared to back. With such a handicap, his energy and eloquence
made him a disturbing influence in any organization to which he
belonged.
The position was complicated by the unusual relationship between
the CDU and CSU. Although the latter claimed to be a separate
party with views of its own, its activities were confined to Bavaria.
In consequence the common assumption for long was that it could
not provide the right-wing candidate for chancellor. Both Bavarians
in general and Strauss in particular were in addition viewed with
suspicion in other parts of Germany. Although Strauss accepted
this bar, it did not prevent him from constantly belittling the
man who was chosen and from trying to dictate policy to the CDU.
In May 1972 Strauss had embarrassed Barzel by rejecting the compromise
over the treaties which he had helped to work out. When in the
spring of 1973 the Basic Treaty came before the Bundestag, Barzel
found his advice rejected by his own party. It preferred to follow
Strauss up what proved to be a blind alley. Coming on top of the
lost election, the rebuff discouraged him, and he resigned.
Barzel was succeeded as head of the parliamentary group by Karl
Carstens, a former official state secretary in the Foreign Office.
The post of party chairman went to Helmut Kohl, a man of 43 who
had made a considerable name for himself as minister-president
of Rhineland-Palatinate. Kohl was one of the most progressive
spirits in the CDU and a good administrator, but he lacked personality
and spoke badly. Strauss was thus provided with both an incentive
and a basis for making mischief.
3. Economic Problems
A fresh bout of inflation developed in 1973, but unlike earlier
ones this was largely home produced. The Mark had been set free
to float, in common with other Common Market currencies, following
the break between the dollar and gold in 1972. The Bundesbank
reacted by pushing up interest rates and thereby checking the
incentive to invest at home. But this effect was counterbalanced
by a flow of funds into the country and by union demands for wage
increases exceeding the rate of growth.
The principal internal reforms which the government did succeed
in carrying through were those establishing the breakdown of a
marriage as the sole ground for divorce and exempting pornography
from prosecution unless it caused social offence. Although both
changes scandalized the old-fashioned, they had been virtually
agreed by all the parties. The FDP finally gave way to SPD insistence
that workers' co-determination must be extended to all firms employing
more than 2,000 persons. After 1976 supervising councils in such
firms were to consist of shareholders and workers' representatives
in equal numbers. The SPD and trade unions agreed reluctantly
to a requirement that one of the seats on the workers' side should
go to a representative of the senior executives.
Controversy continued on how the workers' representatives should
be chosen and how deadlocks were to be resolved. The employers,
led by their chairman Hans-Martin Schleyer, challenged the legality
of the law. In due course the Constitutional Court pronounced
against them. The FDP also accepted a scheme by which firms were
to pay part of their profits into a central fund which would then
pay out to some 24 million workers 200 Marks annually in the shape
of certificates to serve as capital. Agreement could not be reached,
however, on a proposal to tax increases in land values and subject
property owners to closer social control.
To the left-wing SPD and Jusos, these reforms were temporary palliatives.
To give workers a say and share in their firms was not considered
enough. They should have sole control and exclusive ownership.
To get a majority for such sweeping changes was of course out
of the question, but the awareness of this only made the radicals
more impatient with the FDP and indeed with the government as
a whole.
4. The "Radical Decision"
A further cause of strife was the "Radical Decision".
Article 21 of the Basic Law branded as unconstitutional any party
which by its aims or actions set out to influence or set aside
the free democratic order. Furthermore, the law regulating the
public service confined appointments to persons who showed that
they could be "relied on to support at all times the free
democratic system established by the Basic Law." This concept
was inherited from a law passed in the Weimar Republic after the
murders of Erzberger and Rathenau. This requirement came an issue
in the spring of 1972. As part of the dispute over the Eastern
Treaties, the opposition accused the SPD of left-wing sympathies
and raised the danger of communists in public service. (The Communist
party, having been prohibited under the Basic Law in 1952 had
been allowed to re-establish itself in a slightly different form
in 1968.)
The Constitutional Court decided that nobody should be disqualified
simply for belonging to a party. Activity rather than membership
had to be the criterion. At a meeting between Brandt and the ministers-presidents
of the Land governments, it was decided that every applicant for
appointment as an official must be examined as an individual case,
that membership of an organization hostile to the Constitution
raised doubts as to the loyalty of the individual concerned and
that such doubts should as a rule justify rejection.
By making hostility to the constitution, rather than "incompatibility
with the constitution" the test, this decision outflanked
the more liberal ruling of the Court. It also raised the awkward
question of who decided which organizations was to be classed
as "hostile." Those Land governments in which the CDU
or CSU were participating tended to be more strict, than those
where the SPD predominated. But all were able to answer the charge
of allowing communists to infiltrate the government machine, without
having to take the step of once again proscribing the Communist
party and driving it underground.
To appreciate the repercussions of this decision, however, one
has to remember that in Germany not only are the senior staff
of government departments graded as Beamte, but also teachers,
judges, drivers, sanitation workers and grave-diggers. Many legal
and medical posts require a period of training with the government.
To exclude persons on the ground of political opinion was often
equivalent to forbidding them to follow the profession of their
choice, although guaranteed by the Basic Law.
Between January 1973 and June 1975 over 455,000 applications were
examined. In 5,700 cases grounds for doubt were established and
235 refusals occurred. Already in 1973 one or two prominent cases
attracted a great deal of attention. Brandt was beginning to reconsider
the wisdom of the course to which he had committed himself. But
any relaxation of it was bound to be criticized by right-wing
Social Democrats and Free Democrats, not to mention the opposition.
The solution might have been to reduce drastically the number
of posts for which evidence of loyalty was required. Yet, Germans
were not alone in doubting the desirability of allowing communists
to be teachers or to operate official computers. For officials
to turn into politicians and back again has always been easy in
Germany. Any reform which in any way reduced the status of a Beamte
would be unlikely to find favour in a Bundestag where 34 percent
of the deputies possessed that status!
5. University government
In May 1973 the Constitutional Court gave a fresh turn to the
controversy about university government. A case was brought before
it on behalf of 400 Professors in Lower Saxony arguing that the
establishment of threefold parity on university senates was incompatible
with the freedom of learning guaranteed by the Basic Law. The
Court's judgment was couched in theoretical terms from which practical
conclusions had to be deduced.
It began by saying that the participation of all teaching staff
in matters of self government did not infringe the freedom of
learning. The state, in deciding how universities were to govern
themselves, must respect the special position of "those who
are qualified and appointed to represent their field of knowledge
in research and teaching." It left open the question of whether
students and non-teaching staff had a right to a voice. But it
ended by requiring that the teaching staff should have "an
authoritative voice." This was interpreted to mean that,
provided the professors were agreed among themselves, they could
not be outvoted. In matters of research and appointments, their
voice was to be decisive. Junior teaching staff were thus assured
of a say in university affairs, but threefold parity was declared
unconstitutional.
The judgment coincided with a widespread feeling that the democratization
of universities had been carried to lengths which damaged the
quality of their work . It went a long way to restore authority
and order. But it was naturally unpopular with those who equated
authority with tyranny and order with refusal to change. To set
it aside would involve amending the Basic Law, for which the necessary
two-thirds in both houses of parliament were most unlikely to
be forthcoming.
B. Foreign Policy
1. The Brezhnev visit
In May 1973 Brezhnev paid the first visit that a Russian head
of government had made to a non-Communist German state for sixty
years. It was said, with an excess of optimism, to mark the end
of both World War II and the Cold War. In talking to industrial
leaders, the First Secretary held out rosy prospects of long-term
Russo-German co-operation in exploiting Soviet raw material resources.
He pictured the two countries as advancing from coexistence to
interdependence, a process which would necessarily bring with
it both external and internal relaxation.
The Soviet Union needed the technical help of the West, if it
was to retain its military position. At the same time it had to
meet the desires of its peoples for better living conditions.
Nor was West German industry blind to the possibilities. But at
the moment Russian desires were something of an embarrassment
to a country whose industry was at full stretch. East-West trade
showed a clear surplus in favour of the Federal Republic, to whom
the East was heavily indebted. On the other hand the best prospect
of getting paid lay in developing the Eastern output of raw materials
and energy, which could only be achieved by further credits. The
outlook was neither hopeless nor straightforward, but the moment
of sobriety reduced the Kremlin's willingness to twist the arms
of the satellites when difficulties arose in their relations with
West Germany.
2. Polish-German refugees
With Poland these difficulties, though including similar stickiness
over credits, concentrated on the question of refugees. Following
the promises which the Polish government had made at the time
of the 1970 Treaty, 25,000 people of German origin had been allowed
to leave the country in 1971, but in 1972 the number dropped to
13,500 and showed signs of drying up completely. Bonn estimated
that there were 250,000 anxious to leave.
The Poles were nervous about the effect on their economy if too
many skilled workers left too quickly. There also hated to admit
that their efforts to turn Germans and half Germans into Poles
had failed. They raised the question of compensation for those
of their citizens who had suffered in concentration camps. The
West German answer was to point to the vast areas of German territory
which had passed into Polish hands, and to the financial burden
of supporting those who had fled virtually destitute. The Poles
were told that they could not sell the same horse twice, but this
did not stop them from continuing to try. For a time negotiations
languished.
3. The GDR
With the GDR a happy life ever after was something of a fairy
tale. The number of people crossing the frontier in both directions
increased, though East Germans were only allowed to do so if they
were over working age. Meanwhile, the East doubled its charge
for entry permits. In spite of the promise to allow traffic to
pass freely on the roads to West Berlin, periodical police checks
were staged, and difficulties made over the staff of Federal offices
and over parties of schoolchildren taken to demonstrate against
the Wall. It was clear that he Democratic Republic did not want
relaxation, but only the advantages, such as international recognition.
The basic difficultly was that the two German regimes had contradictory
aims which the agreements had not reconciled. For the West, reunification
remained the ideal. Had Brandt refused to leave open the possibility
of it being achieved by agreement at some date in the indefinite
future, he would never have got the treaties ratified. The political
form which a reunited nation would take was left vague, but the
conversion of the Federal Republic into a communist state hardly
seemed likely. But without such a conversion, reunification would
have meant for the East Germans the partial if not complete dismantling
of their system, which was to them unthinkable.
The West hoped that relaxation would gradually lead to the disappearance
of communism, the East to its consolidation. The two sides were,
as the Chinese say, "dreaming discrepant dreams in the same
bed." Honecker's government set out on a campaign of "distinction-drawing,"
doing all in its power to make its country look different from
the one next door. One of these steps was to cut down the use
of the word "German." Another, paradoxically, was to
reemphasize links with the Prussian tradition, in such matters
as army insignia. Indeed, the GDR had much in common with the
state of Frederick the Great.
C. Günther Guillaume
The two governments had promised that they would not interfere
in one another's affairs. But neither did much to reduce the efforts
it had long been making to infiltrate the other's ranks in order
to discover secrets and influence policy. The situation made the
checking of espionage unusually difficult. Not only did the identity
of language make it easier for spies to operate undetected, but
absconders were positively welcomed. The Federal Republic would
have been less well served if it had employed no refugees from
the East. In spite of elaborate precautions and extensive organizations
for counterintelligence, a long series of agents had been uncovered
in high places.
The most spectacular of these came at the end of April 1974. It
was announced that Günther Guillaume, one of Brandt's personal
staff, had admitted to being a communist spy. Guillaume had come
from East Germany in the early 1950s, ostensibly as a faithful
Socialist whose prospects had been ruined by the communists. He
built up a position for himself in the SPD party machine. In due
course he got a transfer to the Chancellor's office. If several
slips had not been made during his security screening, the fact
that he had been suspected of espionage in 1955, should have come
to light. It is not altogether impossible that rabid anti-communists
in the security service deliberately overlooked this so as to
discredit Brandt, whose policies they did not like.
Responsibility for the omissions rested with the FDP minister
of the Interior, Genscher, who had himself come from East Germany
in 1952. As a faithful Liberal, Genscher's prospects had indeed
been ruined by the communists. The culprit could also have been
Ehmke, the minister at the head of Brandt's office. But on 7 May
Brandt announced that he was taking the blame personally and had
resigned as chancellor. His successor was to be Helmut Schmidt.
Brandt's step did him credit, but was not strictly necessary.
He could have blamed Genscher. Brandt's position was complicated
by Scheel having just announced his intention to run for the presidency.
Genscher was booked to succeed him, both as foreign minister and
leader of the FDP. Rumors spread that Guillaume had discovered
some secret in Brandt's personal life, which he threatened to
reveal if the chancellor stayed in office. Brandt was well-known
to have his weaknesses, but if there had been anything serious
to hide, it has never come to light. Moreover, it is hard to see
why Guillaume should have wanted to force him from office. All
Guillaume's masters succeeded in doing was to cause the downfall
of the most sympathetic chancellor they were ever likely to have.
A more probable explanation is that Brandt was losing heart and
interest in the job. He got tired of all the difficulties and
the continual sniping at him for treating the left wing at home
and communists abroad too gently. The losses in Land and communal
elections, which the SPD had recently suffered, also played a
role. He had achieved his main object of realigning West German
policy towards the East in such a way that it could never be wholly
reversed. He had made the SPD into the strongest party in the
Bundestag. He could hardly hope to improve his record.
The previous eighteen months suggested that he would only blot
his record. He probably thought that it was better to go at a
moment of his own choice, rather than wait, like Adenauer, until
retirement was forced on him. A friendly critic said that Willi
Brandt had put too much trust in good faith and too little in
power. He had set out to rouse conviction and sympathy rather
than to mobilize supporters.