We can call the eighteenth century the age of the
enlightenment bcause it was both a culmination and a new beginning.
Fresh currents of thought were wearing down institutionalized
traditions. New ideas and new approaches to old institutions were
setting the stage for great revolutions to come.The main figures of the enlightenment are fairly well known:
Descartes, Pascal, Bayle, Montesquieu, Voltaire, Diderot, and
Rousseau. There were others whom we could call antagonists to
the dominant note, people like Rousseau, Zinzendorf, Wesley, Vico,
and Hume. The pervasive appeal, as expressed by Voltaire, was
to the
These enlightened philosophes made extravagant claims, but
there was more to them than merely negations and disinfectants.
It was primarily a French movement because French culture dominated
Europe and because their ideas were expressed in the environment
of the Parisian salon. Therefore, it was basically a middle-class
movement. They, nevertheless labored for man in general, for humanity.
Clearly the feudal edifice was crumbling, but there was no real
antagonism between the bourgeoisie and the aristocracy as yet.
One can detect the bourgeoisie struggling for freedom from state
regulations and for liberty of commercial activity. It is also
evident that a wave of prosperity brought a greater degree of
self-confidence to the bourgeoisie. Great fortunes were made every
town. Mercantilism was loosening its hold on the economy. By 1750
the reading public came into existence because of increasing literacy.
Yet the philosophes lived a precarious life. They never knew whether
they would be imprisoned or courted. Yet they assumed the air
of an army on the march.
From the 17th century the philosophes inherited the rationalism
of Descartes. but the impulse of natural science alchemized into
the Enlightenment. Newton had discovered a fundamental cosmic
law which was susceptible to mathematical proof and applicable
to the minutest object as well as to the universe as a whole.
Maupertuis and Voltaire made Newton common property by 1750. John
Locke had denied innate ideas and derived all knowledge, opinions
and behavior from sense experience. Condillac carried this to
its conclusion by insisting that even perception was transformed
sensation.
So the traditional anthropocentric view of the universe lay in
ruins and with it the anthropomorphic conception of God. Hence
Montesquieu, Voltaire, the encyclopedists and physiocrats created
the synthesis of social science which was based on past progress.
All of this was done in an atmosphere of religious, political
and economic controversy. Biblical criticism came from Hugo Grotius.
Political economists, shocked by the difference between prosperous
Holland and backward Spain, first posited precious metals as the
source of wealth, then commerce, and then agricultural production
(as developed by the physiocrats).
In all this controversy, social science was beginning to yield
evidence--the critical and historical method of Pierre Bayle.
Exotic travel literature had its effect as well. It supported
the positivist, experimental mentality of the 18th century. It
brought the aura of the "noble savage" into prominence.
There was a moral sense in natural man. Rousseau and the encyclopedists
succumbed to this idea. But that was not the case with Montesquieu
and Voltaire. By 1750 the social sciences had already become inductive,
historical, anthropological, comparative, and critical.
There was great faith in the instrument of reason rather than
mere accumulation of knowledge. Doctrinal substance was not as
important as overall philosophy. We need to keep this in mind
if we want to understand the Enlightenment. It was not so much
Descartes "reason" but rather Newton's laws--not abstraction
and definition, but observation and experience were points of
departure. What placed the stamp on the Enlightenment was this
analytical method of Newtonian physics applied to the entire field
of thought and knowledge. Order and regularity came from the analysis
of observed facts. Lessing said that the real power of reason
lay not in the possession but in the acquisition of truth. So
pure analysis was applied to psychological and social processes.
From here on out the doctrine of historical and sociological determinism
(the application of the principle of causality to social science)
was generally accepted. Many historicists have ridiculed this
naive scientific positivism. By facile dogmatism the philosophes
frequently ignored their own method.
Their new ideal of knowledge was simply a further development
of 17th century logic and science. But there was a new emphasis
on
Except for David Hume's skepticism, the philosophes' faith
in reason remained unshaken.
It was an age of reason based on faith, not an age of faith
based on reason. The enlightenment spiritualized the principle
of religious authority, humanized theological systems, and emancipated
individuals from physical coercion. It was the Enlightenment,
not the Reformation or the Renaissance that dislodged the ecclesiastical
establishment from central control of cultural and intellectual
life. by emancipating science from the trammels of theological
tradition the Enlightenment rendered possible the autonomous evolution
of modern culture. Diderot said, if you forbid me to speak on
religion and government, I have nothing to say. Hence natural
science occupied the front of the stage.
Most of the philosophes wrote on natural science. To Diderot,
d'Holbach and the encyclopedists all religious dogma was absurd
and obscure. LeMettrie and d'Holbach were consistent determinists.
Voltaire disagreed with them and said they had a dogmatism of
their own. Diderot too insisted on the free play of reason. But
he was an unashamed pagan and believed in a kind of pantheism
or pan-psychism, not pure atheism or materialism. He was humanistic,
secular, modern and scientific. He expected from his method a
regeneration of mankind.
English deism, however, was more pervasive in the Enlightenment.
It emphasized an impersonal deity, natural religion and the common
morality of all human beings. Deism was a logical outgrowth of
scientific inquiry, rational faith in humanity, and the study
of comparative religion. All religions could be reduced to worship
God and a commonsense moral code. There was a universal natural
religion.
Yet, it was David Hume, the Englishman, who cut the ground from
under his deist friends (Natural History of Religion). Natural
religion rested on the basic assumption that man is guided by
the dictates of reason. Mind is the scene of the uniform play
of motive. The motives of man are quantitatively and qualitatively
the same at all times and in all places. An empirical study of
the nature of man, said Hume, reveals not an identical set of
motives but a confusion of impulses, not an orderly cosmos but
chaos. The elemental passion, hopes and fears is the root of religious
experience. Religions may be socially convenient but being rooted
in sentiment they lack the validity of scientific generalization.
A rational religion is a contradiction in terms. Hume here comes
close to demolishing the entire rationalist philosophy of the
Enlightenment--its natural rights, its self-evident truths and
its universal and immutable laws of morality.
Voltaire is in the middle between the materialism of the Encyclopedists
and the skepticism of Hume. His ruthless and comic deflation of
theological sophism prevented him from recognizing the deepest
drives of Catholicism. He conveyed the power of intellect to his
generation, but also saw the limitations of reason. Reason was,
after all, a poor instrument, but it was the only weapon that
raised man above the animals. He believed in the argument from
design or "first cause." But this no longer sufficed
Diderot and Hume. Voltaire accepted the classical ideal of the
brotherhood of man and the universal morality of man. He was essentially
a humanist--the greatest humanist of the Enlightenment. He had
not the depth of David Hume or Immanuel Kant, but they could not
have done his work. Voltaire had only one absolute value: the
human race.
The central theme of the Enlightenment is the effort to humanize
religion. All philosophes rejected original sin. Here Pascal became
a problem for them. For Pascal used their method of analytic logic
to prove the existence of original sin and the utter inability
of the unaided human reason o solve the problem without accepting
the authority of faith. How do you explain the "double nature"
of mankind? It becomes intelligible only through the doctrine
of the fall of man. Pascal haunted Voltaire all his life. The
cruel laughter of the Candide could not suppress the problem of
evil. In the upshot he accepted Pascal's analysis of human nature.
By becoming an agnostic he became prisoner of Pascal's argument--reason
without faith ends in skepticism.
Rousseau had a more original solution to Pascal's problem. In
his two discourses he painted a picture of depravity of society
that would have delighted Pascal. If he accepted degeneration
how was he to explain radical evil? He discovered a new agent
of degeneration--the "fall of man"--not god or individual
man but society. Thus salvation comes through the social contract.
Man must save himself. In social justice is the meaning of life.
It was neither a theological or metaphysical solution but a modern
solution.
The Enlightenment rescued history from the antiquarians and
the philologists: Voltaire, Hume, and Gibbon. Pierre Bayle was
the real founder of historical criticism and the intellectual
father of the historians of the Enlightenment (Historical and
Critical Dictionary, 1697). To get at the reliable and incontrovertible
facts of history was for him not a point of departure, but an
end in itself. His Dictionary was a record of errors and historical
falsehoods. He transformed the dictum that history was nothing
more than a record of crimes and misfortunes of mankind. He did
for history what Galileo did for science.
Historical truth could only come from the objective examination
of the human record. The Enlightenment ideas made meaning out
of this record. Empirical causation and human solidarity, despite
incessant warfare, and the idea of progress made a conceptual
mastery of the chaotic and meaningless facts of history. Enlightenment
historians applied the whole culture of their age to the past.
Not the "unique event" of Leopold von Ranke, but the
evolution of generic man--the spirit of the times and nations--are
the essence of history.
At the base of Voltaire's conception of civilization lay the great
monarchies of Europe with their institutions, their quests for
power, but also their promotion of economic welfare, the basis
of cultural progress. Voltaire believed in the republic of scholars
and in the primacy of ideas in historical evolution. Ideas were
the motive force. Thus he became the prophet of progress (Century
of Louis XIV and his more important Essay). But how does one reconcile
progress and the universality of human nature? Human nature reveals
itself only in historical evolution. Progress is the gradual assertion
of reason. To some degree, this was didactic history.
Hume also accepted the uniformity of man and failed to grasp the
irrational factors in human history. But he too asserted the primacy
of ideology. Yet this static view began to change. He believed
neither in reason or in progress and was profoundly occupied with
the historical process--that is with change as such. He put facts
above theory and the unique aspects were more significant than
the common occurrence (History of England). Hume, of course, was
horror-struck with Voltaire's sweeping generalizations.
The philosophes did not discover natural rights theory, but
they made it the foundation of the ethical and social gospel.
They introduced natural rights into practical politics. They gave
natural rights the dynamic force which revealed its explosive
energy in the French Revolution. But their argument moved steadily
away from metaphysics toward empiricism--away from reason toward
experience. Liberty of the person, security of property and freedom
of discussion were less rooted in abstract reason than in commonsense
views of fundamental human needs, impulses and inclinations. In
spite of the utopianism of Rousseau, the rest had a sense of reality.
Reason is still primary, but it is not insurrectionary or bloodthirsty.
Only in society could man realize his full potential. They believed
in the social function of knowledge. Except for Rousseau, none
of the philosophes agitated for a radical transformation of society.
All of them, like Voltaire, defended enlightened absolutism.
Montesquieu published his Spirit of the Laws in 1748. He expressed
here real hatred of despotism, clericalism and slavery. Being
a member of the petit noblesse, he called for an "intermediary
corps" and fundamental laws to temper the monarchy. His former
colleague magistrates called it restitution of the ancient constitution.
So, he influenced both the aristocratic reactionaries who wanted
to revitalize feudal estates and parlements, and the honest liberals
who idealized English constitutionalism with its principle of
separation of powers, the basis of modern constitution-making.
This book was the first study in ideal sociological patterns.
He advocated the examination of a variety of constitutional forms
to discover the republic and its inner law. A network of interacting
forces, if altered, affect the equilibrium of the whole structure.
He is the founder of the typology of constitutional patterns.
The Encyclopedists had a more dynamic conception. But they also
believed in metaphysical norms to which societies must conform.
Hence natural religion, natural morality, natural rights, and
natural economies should prevail. They also popularized the idea
of progress, stated more clearly later by Turgot and Condorcet.
They used the Leibnitz idea of continuity.
The Physiocrats shared with the philosophes a rationalist, hedonist
and utilitarian outlook. Natural rights were thought to be necessary
for economic progress. They were opposed to the rivalry and jealousies
of mercantilism. They reduced all social science to economics.
Quesnay started with an examination of the agricultural situation
in France. He wanted protection for agriculture and promoted the
Third Estate. But agriculture came first and liberalism second.
He thought there should be harmony between positive laws and natural
laws and that this harmony could be established via reason. The
sovereign was to be a "legal despot." This vague utopian
constitutionalism was a regressive step from the ideas of Montesquieu.
Rousseau rejected all compromise with contemporary society. He
called for a moral reformation, a revival of religion, and a purification
of manners. He passionately asserted the moral and legal equality
of man, the sovereignty of the people and the authority of the
general will. He wanted a return to primitive simplicity. While
he realized that his "state of nature" never existed,
he asserted that self-knowledge was the source of his proofs.
In two discourses he exposed his unlimited personal individualism.
Yet in the social contract we get the glorification of unlimited
absolutism of the state. Freedom for Rousseau is the submission
to the law which the individual has imposed on himself. It is
a voluntary consent to a necessary law. By entering this state,
men gain the enlargement of their perceptions and capacities.
Political and intellectual freedom is worthless for man, if he
does not have moral freedom. The function of the state is to bring
legal and moral equality about.
Physical, intellectual and economic equality are beyond human
remedy. The state, according to Rousseau can interfere with property
only if legal and moral equality is jeopardized. In his book Emile
he explains that the young must learn the compulsion of things
but be protected from the tyranny of men. All must obey the general
will as a law of nature, not as an alien command but because of
necessity. This is only possible if society makes the laws which
it obeys. Hence a radical political and social revolution is necessary.
He demanded man's mastery over nature and projected a moral rationalism.
Without a doubt we are here on the road to Immanuel Kant.