EUROPEAN UNIFICATION
The postwar mood of the war-devastated continent, i.e., disillusionment
with nationalism and its excesses, was only one of several factors leading
toward greater European integration. Though the United Nations had been
established, a regional grouping could provide more realistic solutions
for specifically European problems. Economic reconstruction required international
cooperation. The US encouraged the movement as forcefully as it diplomatically
could. The success of men from different countries in the Organization for
European Economic Cooperation (OEEC) in reconciling the claims by different
governments proved the practicality of the European Movement. Indissoluble
bonds must tie the Germans to Western Europe, lest they again someday threaten
peace.
I. The International Movement
The spectacle of a fragmented continent, largely divided between an American
Europe and a Russian Europe, argued for integration. In fact, integration
seemed the only way for Europeans to regain control over their own destinies
or to influence world affairs. It took the stimulus of the Russian menace
looming in the East, and especially the Communist seizure of total power
in Hungary and Czechoslovakia, to spur the Europeans to action. The aggression
in Korea added momentum to the movement. Finally, the display of impotence
by France and Britain in the Suez Crisis argued for some sort of cooperation.
Eventually the dissolution of colonial empires would be persuasive in the
same direction.
Before the Second World War the most persistent advocate of European unification
had been Count Richard Coudenhove-Kalergi, who, fittingly enough, was supremely
internationalist in his own family background through Dutch, German, Greek,
Italian, Norwegian, Polish, and Japanese ancestors. His childhood home was
located directly on the German-Slav language border in Bohemia. The count's
outlook, like that of many aristocratic families in the Austro-Hungarian
Empire, stemmed back to the days before the national state had gained total
allegiance among Europeans. A number of influential statesmen had also voiced
hopes for some form of union.
Shortly before Europe began its grim descent to the Second World War, Aristide
Briand, French foreign minister, rose in a session of the League of Nations
to propose a United States of Europe. In the desperate hours of French collapse
in 1940, Prime Minister Churchill offered the French a Franco-British union.
Three years later, in a radio speech to the continent, he talked about a
postwar Council of Europe, and, after the war, at the University of Zurich
suggested ''a kind of United States of Europe.'' Charles de Gaulle also
expressed some thoughts about a closer association of the ''races'' of Europe.
Still another form of union proposed during the war and immediately thereafter
was some sort of Atlantic community, also including the United States and
Canada and possibly other countries.
Numerous associations for the furtherance of greater integration were at
work after the war. Coudenhove-Kalergi's European Parliamentary Union held
a conference at Gstaad, Switzerland in July, 1947, and followed it with
others, Churchill was affiliated with Britain's United Europe Movement,
and similar societies existed in France, Germany, and the smaller states.
An international committee of these organized the Congress of Europe, which
met at the Hague on May 7-10, 1948, and drew 750 delegates, among them some
of Europe's leading statesmen, including Churchill, Paul-Henri Spaak, de
Gasperi, Bidault, Schuman and Blum.
This Congress set the ambitious goal of nothing less than the political
and economic unification of the continent. From the beginning, the attitude
of the British government retarded the movement. Not only did the Labor
party suffer the customary hesitancies of a ministry in power and therefore
responsible for decisions, but also it was divided over the advisability
itself of European unification' The sheer fact that the opposition leader
strongly supported action soured the Laborites on it, while the leftists
wing suspected the whole business as a maneuver against the Soviet Union.
This, in turn, had its impact on continental Socialist parties, though some
Socialists, like Spaak, were in the van of the advocates. Then, too, many
conservatives were opposed on nationalist grounds, or shared Laborite concern
over how continental commitments could be reconciled with commonwealth obligations.
II. The Council of Europe
The first fruits of the internationalist movement came with the establishment
of the Council of Europe. After the Congress at The Hague, the five Brussels
states joined in negotiations with five others, with the French holding
the initiative in the absence of strong British leadership. On May 5, 1949,
the statute for the Council was signed, and the first meeting occurred at
Strasbourg, which became its headquarters, in September. The ten original
signatories included France, the United Kingdom, Belgium, The Netherlands,
Luxembourg, Italy, Ireland, Denmark, Norway, and Sweden. In later years
they were joined by Greece, Turkey, Iceland, West Germany, Cyprus, Switzerland,
and Malta. The Saar was an associate member (1950-1955) until its incorporation
into West Germany.
Though founded in the full tide of enthusiasm and hopes for a better day,
its limitations were visible from the beginning. First of all, the split
of the continent between East and West manifested itself in the total absence
of all countries of the Communist bloc. Then the necessity of a compromise
with British Labor, and its coolness toward granting any genuine powers,
resulted in a much weaker organization. The Consultative Assembly, which
ardent federalists favoring a United States of Europe had visualized as
a genuine parliament, would only have the power of recommendation, and in
consequence the Committee of Ministers, made up of the foreign ministers
of the member states, held the decisive position; it, in turn, represented
the interests of the sovereign states rather than the internationalist viewpoint.
As originally set up, the Assembly consisted of 138 members, each country
being represented by delegates in rough proportion to population; the smallest
(Luxembourg) had three members and the four largest had 18 apiece. A Secretariat
at Strasbourg served as the coordinating organ of the Council.
The Council of Europe was thus doomed to an advisory role, debating issues
without authority to act. Spaak, the first president of the Assembly, resigned
in protest. In 1953 a committee of the Council produced a draft treaty for
a European political community, but the proposal got no further. The Council
has continued to serve as a sounding board for European opinion, but the
main course of development in the following years would emerge in other
channels.
III. The Schuman Plan
On May 5, 1950, Foreign Minister Robert Schuman of France announced to a
press conference the so-called Schuman Plan for the creation of a free market
in coal and steel under supranational authority. Though bearing Schuman's
name, Jean Monnet had contributed more to the proposal; as head of French
reconstruction plans, this ardent advocate of greater European unity was
especially well placed for initiating the movement. Calling it ''a bold
act--a constructive act,'' Schuman argued for the plan on the basis, particularly,
that placing a portion of French and German industry directly involved in
armaments under one common authority would make future war between the two
impossible.
''The French government proposes to place Franco-German production of coal
and steel under a common High Authority, within the framework of an organization
open to the participation of other countries in Europe.'' War between the
two would then be not merely unthinkable but materially impossible.'' It
would also, he said, be a first step to a European federation. In response
to his invitation, the Benelux countries and Italy also entered the negotiations.
Britain's governing Labor party, remaining hostile to any suggestion of
infringement of national sovereignty, refused to participate. The draft
for the Community was signed by representatives of the six countries on
April 18, 1951, and ratified by the following summer.
A. High Authority
At the head of the ECSC was placed a High Authority of nine members, eight
chosen by the six governments and one selected by the other eight. Not responsible
to the governments, the High Authority would serve as executive of an organization
whose laws and directives were binding upon all; hence, the Europeans of
these states had finally broken with the dogmas of national sovereignty,
in a limited area, in order to seek the welfare of them all through a wider
entity. The Authority had powers to draw up plans, set maximum and minimum
prices when necessary, assure free competition by preventing monopoly and
unfair practices, and take steps to make certain of the welfare of management,
employees, and consumers.
B. Common Assembly
A Common Assembly could censure the High Authority by a two-thirds vote,
whereupon they must resign and a new group replace them. It consisted originally
of 78 members, 18 each from France, Italy, and West Germany, ten each from
Belgium and The Netherlands, and four from Luxembourg. They could be selected
by the parliaments or, if desired in any country, be chosen directly by
the electorate. In the Assembly they were to sit according to political
persuasion, that is, by political parties, rather than in national groups.
(In the Council of Europe, the Assembly members are seated in alphabetical
order.)
C. Council of Ministers
A Council of Ministers, made up of the appropriate ministers from the national
cabinets, would seek to coordinate the work of the Authority and the economic
policies of the national governments. A High Court of seven judges handled
appeals from governments, individual companies, or associations; it could
also annul any action exceeding the powers given to the Community. The headquarters
of the Community was placed in Luxembourg, though the Common Assembly was
to meet at Europe House in Strasbourg. Monnet assumed the presidency of
the Authority and held it until he resigned in 1955 in order to set in motion
an even more ambitious program of integration. That other stalwart proponent
of unification, Spaak, was elected first president of the Common Assembly.
The European Coal and Steel Community turned into a spectacular success.
In its first ten years, steel production rose 74 per cent to 72.7 million
metric tons, of which Germany was responsible for 32.6 million and France
17.2 million. This total amounted to about one-fifth of that in the world.
Iron ore went up 41 per cent, and trade in iron ore within the Six tripled
during the ten years, while, equally important, coal and steel prices remained
far more stable than in other countries. So successful was the expansion
that overproduction had become a problem by the mid-Sixties. Coal rose slightly
in the first years, then began a slow, steady decline because such other
sources of power as oil and natural gas were being increasingly used. Oil,
in fact, was providing over one-half of the Community's energy requirements
and its proportion continued to grow. As for the coal industry, the Community
proved its usefulness even here by retraining coal miners (129,000 of them
in ten years) , especially in hardest hit Belgium, for other occupations.
IV. European Defense Community
After the original Schuman proposal, but long before the Community had been
established, another aspect of European integration had been forcibly brought
to the fore by the Communist attack in Korea. The newly established German
Federal Republic was unarmed, French troops were largely overseas, the British
scattered by their imperial commitments, and now the Americans were fighting
in Korea. NATO's 14 to 16 divisions constituted only a feeble shield against
the large military forces of the Soviet Union, and NATO itself was still
in the early stages of being organized when the storm broke in the Far East.
General Dwight D. Eisenhower returned to Europe in early 1951 as the first
supreme Allied Commander, with headquarters at SHAPE (Supreme Headquarters
Allied Powers Europe), located at Rocquencourt outside of Paris.
As the only major new source of additional troops, Dean Acheson proposed
to add German divisions to NATO. Only five years after the Wehrmacht had
finally been subdued and only shortly after the complete disarmament and
demilitarization of the Germans, the Europeans now faced the prospect of
their bearing arms again! However frightened they might be of Communist
aggression, the thought of entrusting their own security to German hands
was not a comforting one.
Premier Rene Pleven of France quickly came up with an alternative, the so-called
Pleven Plan, whereby a ''European Army'' would be established, no national
units to be larger than battalion or brigade strength. This allowed the
Germans to make their manpower contribution without having a general staff,
or national army, or industrial plant for armaments. Prolonged negotiations
ended in a six-power pact, signed on May 27, 1952, for the European Defense
Community. It provided for an army of about 40 divisions in which no national
unit would be larger than a single division, with soldiers all to be clad
in a special European army uniform, and with a general staff in common.
Troops not placed in the EDC army, such as soldiers on colonial duty or
providing internal security, remained under their own flag, that is, the
five countries still could possess national armies. Taking its ultimate
military orders from the Supreme Commander of NATO, the European army would
be under the immediate control of a supranational authority resembling the
Coal and Steel Community, with a nine-man executive, a council of ministers,
a court, and an enlarged Schuman Plan assembly.
The Germans had naturally put a price on their cooperation, and by the Bonn
Conventions, signed the day before the EDC treaty, they were to be restored
to full sovereignty and the occupation ended. At this point, the hopeful
European federalists thought the time was approaching for capping the structure
by creating a European political community also.
These hopes were not to be realized. The panic of the Korean attack subsided,
and the death of Stalin in March, 1953, reduced the danger of a Russian
attack. The French, who had started the project, also killed it, the more
nationalistic being adamantly opposed to dividing their army in this fashion,
while still others also feared that the Germans ultimately would dominate
the whole setup, in the absence of the British. Great Britain had once again
declined to participate in a supranational arrangement, and without them
to help balance the scales, the French balked for more than two years at
ratifying the treaty. A British treaty guaranteeing military aid to the
EDC, and American promises to keep soldiers in Europe, did not persuade
the French. Nor did Dulles' threat that unless the EDC were established,
the Americans might be forced to an ''agonizing reappraisal'' of their continued
presence on the continent. On August 30, 1954, with the parties split on
the issue, but with intense Communist, Gaullist, and other right-wing opposition,
the French assembly rejected the treaty by a vote of 319 to 264.
It was a debacle which could not be left as such. Foreign Minister Eden
and Dulles both rushed to the rescue, and quite quickly the new arrangement
was worked out: The Brussels Pact would be expanded into a Western European
Union by including Italy and the German Federal Republic, as well as the
original Brussels states. The national governments retained sovereign control
over their military forces, and the Germans could rearm within the framework
of the WEU and NATO to the limit of 12 divisions. The scheme was finalized
in the London Conference of September 27 to October 3, 1954, and signed
in Paris on October 23, hence its name of The Paris Accords.
V. European Economic Community
Fearing a permanent loss of momentum after the defeat of the proposal for
the EDC, Monnet led a renewed crusade on behalf of the European Movement.
On June l, 1955, the foreign ministers of the six states of the European
Coal and Steel Community met at Messina, Italy, and agreed to work for the
expansion of the original Common Market and to create a European authority
for the development of nuclear energy. A special committee, headed by Spaak,
was set up to seek ways and means of reaching these objectives.
The committee recommended that the participants be limited, at first, to
the six countries whose social and economic systems and levels of economic
development were sufficiently similar to make the necessary adjustments
the least painful. For the next two years a group of experts worked on the
plan at Val-Duchesse, an estate outside of Brussels, referring repeatedly
to the governments concerned for policy decisions. On March 25, 1957, sufficient
progress had been made to permit the representatives of the Six to gather,
after braving a pouring rainstorm, in the Hall of the Horatii and Curatii
on Capitoline Hill in Rome for the signing of the documents setting up the
EEC or European Economic Community and Eurotom. It was a momentous occasion
fittingly held in Rome, the ancient capital of European civilization and
the city most associated with the dream of European political unity.
The Treaty of Rome went into effect on January 1, 1958, after ratification
by the governments concerned. This establishment of a customs union--the
six nations, in fact, agreed to coordinate their social and economic policies
to a degree far exceeding that of a customs union--seemed likely to become
one of the most important developments of the century for the peoples of
Europe. The core of the continent was attempting to reassert its individuality
by organizing into a unit of approximately equal population and economic
strength to the two dominant powers.
This customs union formed an entity roughly comparable to the United States
and the Soviet Union in economic power. Its population of 167 million, in
some of the world's most industrialized nations, was not far behind the
178 million of the United States and the Soviet Union's 209 million. In
steel production the EEC was slightly ahead of the USSR. Its proportionate
share of the world trade ran considerably ahead of either of the two. The
impact of the Common Market would be felt in, and influence the conduct
of, virtually every country in the world, whether as a bulwark against Communist
expansion, a magnet drawing other nations into its economic orbit, a rival
or partner for the United States, or as a model for other similar experiments.
Send questions and suggestions to Professor
Gerhard Rempel, Department of History, Western New England College.
Last Revised 12-18-95.