Peter's Russia




Until the latter part of the seventeenth century, Russia seemed even less likely to survive as an independent state than Poland. Like Poland, Russia was a huge country with no natural boundaries along either its eastern or western frontiers.

I. The Rise of Moscovy

Throughout the Middle Ages, European Russia had been invaded time and again by hordes that swept across the Asiatic plains, over the low Ural Mountains that separate the two continents, and onto the fiat plains north of the Black Sea, where they spread in all directions. At the same time, the excellent network of rivers flowing northward into the Baltic Sea and southward into the Black Sea provided highways through which invaders from the north and cultural influences from the south penetrated into the center of the country. The western borders were equally indefensible, and several times during the early seventeenth century Russian independence was threatened by the Poles and Swedes. Thus, Russia lay in the heartland of the Eurasian continent on a crossroads of north.south and east-west movements that prevented the country from belonging wholly to either the East or the west.

A relatively advanced state began to develop along the Dnieper River in the ninth century. Its capital, Kiev, became an important trading city. Cultural contacts were established with the Byzantine empire, and the in- habitants became converts of the Greek Orthodox Church.

This promising beginning was cut short by the Mongol invasion in 1240. The various principalities into which Kievan Russia had become divided were overrun, and contacts with the Byzantine civilization were sharply reduced. The Russians were thus isolated from the more advanced culture to the south, while the intellectual manifestations of the Renaissance failed to reach them.

For a time it seemed possible that the future of Russia might lie with the city-state of Novgorod, situated in the northwest, far from the center of Mongol power. Novgorod had trading connections with the West, but its relatively exposed position made it subject to repeated attacks by the Scandinavians, Germans, and Lithuanians. Although the inhabitants man- aged to repel these assaults, they were seriously weakened by the constant wars. The southwestern portion of the former Kievan state was less fortunate, for after a long struggle the region was conquered by Lithuania.

After Lithuania joined Poland in a dynastic union in 1386, Polish influence became strong. The result was that linguistic and ethnic divisions that had already begun to appear among the Russian people were solidified. European Russia became divided into White Russia and the Ukraine, which fell to Poland-Lithuania, and Great Russia to the north and east, which remained under Mongol control. In the end, it was the principality of Muscovy located in the Great Russian part of the former Kievan state that succeeded in providing the nucleus for the future Russian empire.

Around the middle of the fourteenth century, Muscovy consisted of only six hundred square miles, but under a series of able princes the little state managed to expand its territory. The most important of these rulers was Ivan III (1462-1505), called the Great, who occupies a place in Russian history comparable to that occupied by the Renaissance monarchs in the West. He threw of what remained of the Mongol yoke and, through purchase, inheritance, and especially conquest, won the surrounding states, the most important of which was once-mighty Novgorod itself. In 1472, be married the niece of the last Byzantine emperor. This marriage led the Muscovite rulers to adopt the title of tsar or caesar and to imitate the coronation ceremony and court ritual of the Byzantines. More important, it provided a theoretical and moral claim to justify the emergence of a monarchy that was actually based on military force.

Once Muscovy became stronger than its neighbors, the very network of north-south rivers and east-west plains that had made invasion so easy facilitated rapid expansion in every direction except the west. Here, for a century, strong Polish and Swedish states checked the Muscovite advance. Ivan III's grandson, Ivan IV (1533-1584), called the Terrible, won control of the entire Course of the Volga River by conquering several Mongol states, and the penetration into Siberia was begun. Turning to the west, he won an outlet on the Baltic Sea only to lose it to the Swedes some years later. The latter part of his reign was marred by attacks of insanity. The mad king murdered all who opposed him; the great nobles received most of his wrath, but even his son and heir fell by his own hand.

The death of Ivan IV's weak and childless son in 1598 brought the dynasty to an end. There followed a confused fifteen-year period known as the Time of Troubles. The Zemsky Sobor or estates-general elected Boris Godunov, one of the great nobles, tsar, but he died a few years later. First one and then another pretender laid claim to the throne, each claiming to be a tsar's son. Both received foreign help, and one even managed to seize and hold the throne for a brief period. For a time, it looked as though a Polish prince would become king and form a dynastic union of the two Slavic kingdoms. Finally, the wars and murders led to a reaction, and in 1613, the Zemsky Sobor elected a young noble, Michael Romanov, tsar. Michael (1613-1645), unlike Sobieski, was able to establish his dynasty on the throne where it remained until the Revolution of 1917. During his reign, an expedition crossed Siberia reaching the Pacific in 1637, and during that of his son, Alexis I (1645-1676), part of the Ukraine, including Kiev, was won back from Poland.

II. Evolution of Russian Society

Meanwhile, Russian society had been changing. In its early days, Muscovy, like the other little states into which European Russia was divided during the period of Mongol suzerainty, was ruled by a prince in conjunction with a council of boyars, a class of nobles who held land with no obligation to serve the prince. The prince, the boyars, and the Church owned nearly all the land. Local administration and justice were in the hands of these landowners or their agents. The peasants who worked in the fields during this period were usually freemen, but wars, famines, plagues, and other catastrophes gradually increased their dependence on the landlord. In return for a loan of money, food, or tools, they promised to pay dues and perform labor services. Once in debt, they were not permitted to leave the soil until after the autumn harvest, and then only if their obligations had been fulfilled.

As the Muscovite state expanded, the conquered lands became the property of the tsar, who assigned them to his principal assistants in return for their support. Thus, a service gentry came into being that, as the state grew, became the most powerful class in the kingdom, just as a reconstituted aristocracy in the West became the most powerful class in the Renaissance monarchy.

The triumph of the service gentry spelled disaster for the peasants who worked the land. Their right to leave the soil even if their debts had been paid was removed around 1600. Many fled to the vast unoccupied stretches along the ever-expanding frontier, where they established free democratic, warlike societies. Such fugitive peasants became known as cossacks. Their departure, added to the wars and famines during the Time of Troubles, led to a scarcity of labor in central Russia. The gentry redoubled its efforts to keep the remaining peasants on the soil. For a time, if a peasant escaped and eluded capture for a specified number of years, he became legally free, but in 1649 this time limit was abolished and the peasants on the land of the service gentry became perpetual serfs.

No limits were placed on the services rendered by the serfs, and since the landowners were charged with justice and law enforcement on their estates, the serfs were at their mercy. By the close of the seventeenth century, they could even be bought and sold. Their position was far worse than the serfs in the medieval West; they were little better than slaves. Only the peasants on the estates kept by the tsar for his own support enjoyed a more favorable position. These estates were located for the most part to the north and east of Moscow, where there had been less need to grant estates to a service gentry to facilitate the expansion or defense of the empire.

By the middle of the seventeenth century, Russian society had become stratified. There was an aristocracy consisting of the boyars and the service gentry and an agricultural population consisting of crown peasants and serfs. Stratification had also developed in the towns, where the artisans were sharply separated from the merchants. Even among the boyars, the existence of a rigid hierarchy compelled the tsar to make his important appointments in accordance with the standing of each individual family rather than on merit. As a result, social mobility was reduced during the seventeenth century crisis in Russia just as it had been in the West.

III. Russian Institutions

The Muscovite rulers claimed to be divinely ordained, absolute monarchs. Moscow, they argued, was a third Rome, the now-conquered Constantinople having been the second. In assuming the title of tsar, they claimed to be the successors of the caesars. But with all their imperial titles and ceremonies, their government was popular and consultative like the Renaissance monarchies in the West. Important decisions had to be consented to by a council of boyars known as the Duma. The need to reach other influential classes was also recognized, and in 1550 Ivan IV summoned the first full meeting of the Zemsky Sobor to give its approval to some projected reforms. This institution, which in many ways resembled the estates-generals in the West, consisted initially of appointed members of the clergy, boyars, and service gentry, but townsmen were later added, and on at least one occasion the crown peasants participated.

Ivan IV had seen in the Zemsky Sobor an instrument for learning the grievances of the people and persuading the influential elements of the population to support his program, for no ruler in this age had the army or the bureaucracy to make innovations that the bulk of his more vocal subjects opposed. After the disappearance of the old reigning dynasty, however, it became necessary for the Zemsky Sobor to elect a new tsar on several occasions. The Romanovs themselves owed their throne to a choice made by this institution. As a result, Michael Romanov consulted it frequently when he was tsar and invariably won its consent for the taxes he levied. In this manner, the tsar and the Zemsky Sobor came to share in the government of the empire as the king and the estates had in the West during the Renaissance.

The usual departments of government were established in Moscow, and governors were appointed to administer the individual provinces. These governors quickly escaped from the control of the central bureaucracy and acted as they pleased. A degree of local self-government also developed during the sixteenth century. Positions in the judiciary, police, and municipalities were often elective, and local assemblies called zemstvos were organized to deal with judicial, financial, and administrative matters. Thus, some of the popular and decentralized aspects of the Renaissance monarchies had parallel developments in Russia.

There was one important exception to this rule. The Western state was created by dynastic marriages and the reverting of great feudal duchies to the crown. Under these circumstances, each former kingdom and duchy kept its own laws, institutions, and special privileges. The Russian state, on the other hand, was created primarily by military conquest, and the laws and institutions of Muscovy were imposed on the entire empire. Local variations disappeared, and a common legal and institutional structure emerged. Only England, thanks to the Norman conquest, could boast equal uniformity in these respects.

IV. Religion and Culture

The contrast between Russia and the West was more striking in the areas of religion and culture. Byzantine culture had penetrated into the region during the Kievan period, and the inhabitants had been converted to the Greek Orthodox religion. During the Mongol period, contact with Constantinople had been reduced, leaving native elements free to re-emerge. By the sixteenth century, culture and social life reflected both native Russian and Greek-Byzantine characteristics. Men wore beards, and gentlewomen were veiled and secluded. Drunkenness and coarse humor were accepted without question. Education was rare, and the art of cultivated conversation unappreciated. There was no national literature comparable to that found in the West and little art outside the churches. Able craftsmen were scarce, and science was in a primitive state. Neither Arabic numerals nor the Western calendar had been adopted, and church ritual and literature had been corrupted. In short, Russia was centuries behind both the Western and the Greek Orthodox worlds in nearly every aspect of civilization.

The defeat of the Mongols and the rapid expansion of the Muscovite state made possible renewed contacts with Constantinople and the West. Western ideas began to creep in through neighboring Poland and were carried to Moscow itself by English merchants during the reign of Ivan IV. Germans and other foreigners began to settle in Moscow, where they were restricted to a quarter in the city. of more immediate importance, con- tacts with the better-educated Greek orthodox clergy in the Ottoman Empire were increased, and the head of the Muscovite Church was recognized as a patriarch by the orthodox prelates in other parts of the world. This enabled him to strengthen his hold over the clergy in his own country and led to an attempt to bring Russian ritual into line with the Orthodox ceremony elsewhere. A large part of the lower clergy resisted these foreign innovations, but the tsar and the ecclesiastical hierarchy attempted to impose them by force. The struggle began in the reign of Alexis (1645 1676), the second Romanov monarch.

Alexis was more cultivated than most of his predecessors, but he was too weak and kindly to compel his subjects to adopt the ways of the West. It is surprising that he permitted his desire to reform the Greek Orthodox Church to be pushed to the point that it led to schism. Many errors had crept into Russian religious books; poor translations and editing had even led the name of Jesus to be misspelled. Time had caused the Russian ritual to vary from the Greek Orthodox. under the leadership of the patriarch and with Alexis, approval, orders were issued to print correct editions of the Bible and other religious works and to adopt the Greek ritual.

To the Old Believers, as the fundamentalists were called, these innovations altered the basis of their religion. They had accepted the old throughout their lives without question and lacked the education to recognize the reasons for change. They resisted, and the quarrel between the state and ecclesiastical hierarchy on one hand and the Old Believers on the other continued for years. No amount of persecution could make the Old Believers abandon their beliefs, but in the end their lack of ecclesiastical organization caused them to break up into sects, some of which still exist today.

Happily for Alexis, the old Believers did not become deeply involved in the social uprisings during his reign, and neither the religious nor the social rebels used the Zemsky Sobor as an institution around which to rally discontent. Russia had had its Reformation that ended in schism, but unlike that of the West, it had taken place in response to the demands of the ecclesiastical hierarchy, rather than demands from segments of the lower clergy and the people.

The issues at stake had been primarily ritualistic rather than dogmatic, and the support of the old Believers had come from the small merchants and surviving peasantry rather than the gentry. The resistance to established authority had therefore been less dangerous than in the Protestant movement, which had won many noble converts, and the Russian state survived with relative ease. The Zemsky Sobor was rarely convoked after 1653, and the Russian Church itself was so weakened by the loss of many of its most devout members that it succumbed to state control before the end of the century.

Under Alexis, the Russian Church had reintegrated with the Greek orthodox and the penetration of Western ideas into a few circles had continued, but it remained for his son, Peter the Great (1689-1725), to bring Russia into the mainstream of European politics.

V. Peter the Great

Peter was only four when his father died, and in the tumultuous years that followed, his life was in danger several times. Once, drunken soldiers spent three days in the royal palace murdering officials whom they opposed; at another time, he fled the palace in his nightshirt to escape assassination. Such an atmosphere was hardly conducive to a normal academic education, but Peter did manage to frequent the foreign quarter of Moscow. There he became acquainted with the West-with its tobacco, its mechanical gadgets, and its free association of men and women. There he found his first mistress, Anna Mons, and his lifetime love, the ship. There he came to realize that Russia must modernize or risk losing its independence.

At seventeen, Peter seized control of the government from his older sister who had ruled during his minority, but he was still an overgrown boy more interested in playing soldier or sailor than in governing. Already, some of his later characteristics were plainly in evidence-his great size, his tremendous energy, his love for doing things with his hands, and his utter ruthlessness. He always insisted on beginning at the bottom and working his way up through the ranks. He served as an able seaman, a common soldier, a carpenter, a mechanic, a barber, a dentist. Promotion was rapid, but it was granted only after he had mastered a vocation.

In 1697, when he dispatched an embassy of 250 to learn about the West and to form an alliance against the Turks, Peter joined the group incognito. He worked as a carpenter in Holland; in England, he is reported to have ruined his landlord's prize holly hedge "by trundling his wheelbarrow through it." He returned to Moscow in 1698, firmly determined to Westernize his own mammoth kingdom.

Some of Peter's reform smacked of the ridiculous. Westerners wore no beards; therefore, Russian beards must be removed. He personally shaved his courtiers, but many of his subjects resisted; to shave, they felt, was to deface the image of God, for had not man been created in His likeness? The religious taboo was so strong that the practical tsar had to content himself with levying a tax on beards. He encouraged smoking, but taxed tobacco. He practiced the art of dentistry, to the discomfiture of his courtiers and did not hesitate to direct a choir. When he ordered the extermination of the rebellious Moscow guard, it was said that this furious man personally assumed the role of,executioner.

Yet it was all done for a purpose. He was determined that blind adherence to the past must cease and that every member of the gentry must learn to serve the state. He insisted that they start at the bottom, in either the army, navy, or administration, and work their way up just as he himself had done. Birth and family influence meant nothing. Ability was the only criterion. He also insisted that the gentry receive an elementary school education. When many failed to observe the edict, Peter decreed that a diploma must be produced before a member of the gentry could marry. Russians were sent to the West to be educated. Skilled workers and military, naval, and administrative experts were imported from abroad.

When Charles XII of Sweden completely defeated the numerically superior Russian army at Narva, Peter instigated military reforms. Peasant and burgher were subjected to conscription for twenty-five years. They were given flintlocks and bayonets in place of the outmoded muskets and pikes. Artillery was improved, discipline enforced, and the army enlarged. By the time of his death, Peter had a force of 210,000 men without counting the irregulars, a substantial army for a nation of only 13,000,000 inhabitants. He was equally the father of the Russian navy.

Perhaps Peter's most remarkable achievement was that he effected these improvements without foreign loans, or even loans from local capitalists, who were nonexistent. The ruthless, energetic tsar extracted the necessary money from his subjects in the form of higher taxes and greater services. Governmental income was five and a half times as high in 1724 as it had been in 1680. Just as the Russian Communists have in this century built a mighty industrial power through oppressive measures, so Peter built a mighty military force and laid the foundations for future industrial growth by driving his subjects ruthlessly.

He reorganized the central government along Western lines. What remained of the consultative, self governing aspects of the old monarchy disappeared. The Zemsky Sobor was not summoned, and the boyar duma was ignored. Peter did not, however, follow Louis XIV's practice of excluding the nobility from the government. Instead, he insisted that they serve the state and what little distinction remained between the old boyar families and the service gentry was obliterated.

A senate was created to supervise administrative, financial, and judicial affairs, and ministries were established for war, finance, commerce, foreign affairs, and other branches of government. A group of ministers, called a college, headed each of these agencies rather than a single official because the restless monarch trusted the wisdom of several men more than one alone. Peter divided the country into forty-three provinces, each administered by a governor responsible to him, and he sent out inspectors to see that he was obeyed. Industry and mining were encouraged, and by the time of his death, the Russians were probably producing more pig iron than the English.

The Greek Orthodox Church was brought more directly under the control of the state. Peter abolished the office of patriarch and substituted a Holy Synod, or church council, composed of leading ecclesiastics, and a lay chief procurator whom he appointed to guide its work. No longer was there a patriarch to rival the tsar in importance. The calendar was altered to conform to the Western practice of beginning the new year on January 1 and of numbering the years from the birth of Christ rather than from the creation of the world, as had been the Russian practice.

Arabic numerals were introduced, and the alphabet was simplified. A newspaper was established with, of course, the energetic tsar editing the first issue. Peter corresponded with leading Western scholars and laid plans for an academy of science, but death denied him the glory of attending the first session. In November, 1724, when he saw a shipwreck, he characteristically jumped into the cold northern water to assist in the rescue. Sickness resulted, and death followed several months later.

Peter had often been troubled about what might happen to his reforms after his death, for a majority in every class resisted his innovations. To ensure continual contact with the West, he had wrested the eastern shores of the Baltic from the Swedes. Here he built St. Petersburg, a new capital, that could be reached far more easily from the West than landlocked Moscow. The cost in money and lives was tremendous, but peter drove the work towards completion. He organized the social life of the court along Western lines. Even his own manners improved somewhat, and by 1712 a courtier could report that at a private dinner with the Prussian royal family Peter neither belched nor picked his teeth "at least as far as l heard or saw."

Perhaps the most important step that Peter took to ensure the continuation of Western influence in Russia was to introduce the practice of marrying royal princes to Western princesses. Thereafter, nearly every tsar had a German wife, and thus the German influence became strong in upper-class circles. Peter himself had been married to the daughter of a Russian nobleman in his youth in accordance with the earlier practice, but he put her in a convent soon after he began to govern personally. Perhaps realizing that under the circumstances he could not hope to find a suitable Western princess for himself, he eventually married his mistress, Catherine. Catherine was a Lithuanian of low origin who had already given him three children, but she proved a fit companion for the restless monarch.

The most immediate threat to continued Westernization came from Peter's son, Alexis. Alexis was the direct opposite of his father. He was cultivated, but lazy. Father and son soon quarreled, and Alexis joined the enemies of Westernization. Matters became worse and Alexis fled to Austria in 1716. Peter saw that if he permitted Alexis to succeed him, his work would be undone. He coaxed Alexis back to Russia with promises of forgiveness, but once he got his hands on his son, he had him tortured to learn of his plans and accomplices. Alexis was tried and condemned to death, but before Peter announced his final decision, Alexis died; officially from apoplexy, more probably from violence. Even Peter lacked the courage to execute his son publicly.

It is difficult to evaluate Peter's work. By his energy and ruthlessness he modernized Russia to the extent that it was strong enough to escape the fate of Poland and the Ottoman Empire, but the deeper aspects of Western culture never penetrated below the aristocracy, and the masses of the Russian people were forced down lower than ever. They remained in ignorance, now separated culturally as well as economically and socially from their superiors.




Send comments and questions to Professor Gerhard Rempel, Western New England College.